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IN 1984 spokesmen for heavily indebted developing nations complained 
about the sharp interest rate increases that had come in the wake of the 
U.S.  economic  recovery.  Emphasizing that the U.S.  recovery  had also 
spilled over into record export growth rates for developing  countries, 
President Reagan commented on the trade-offs in the following terms: 
We sometimes hear complaints  about U.S.  interest rates, particularly  by 
debtor nations, which are legitimately concerned about the additional  debt 
service costs they must bear. But not enough  mention  is made  of trade  and the 
far  greater  benefits  developing  countries  receive  from  renewed  economic  growth 
and  open market  policies of the United States. 
For the U.S. alone, imports  from  the non-Opec  LDC's during  the first  seven 
months  of this year increased  by more  than $12 billion  over the amount  during 
the same  period  last year. By comparison,  a 1 percent  increase  in interest  rates 
would increase net interest payments by the non-Opec LDC's by only $2.5 
billion.  ' 
This paper investigates  the impact of macroeconomic  developments 
in the industrialized nations on LDCs,  in part to assess  such trade-offs 
as that between increased LDC exports and higher interest rates resulting 
from U.S.  growth.  Such  assessments  will  help  in understanding the 
sharply  divergent  economic  performance  of  LDCs  and  in judging 
whether the current debt crisis can be expected  to disappear through the 
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mere passage of time or only through  major  and painful  adjustments  on 
the part  of LDCs, for which some may be better  equipped  or positioned 
than  others. 
A starting  point  is a comparison  of recent  growth  performance  among 
LDCs in Asia and in Latin America. Shown below are growth  rates in 
real income pet capita for the period 1980-84 (1980-83 in the case of 
Indonesia)  for several  countries. 
Annual rate of growth (percent) 
Asia  Latin America 
Indonesia  2.5  Argentina  - 3.2 
Korea  5.9  Brazil  - 2.4 
Malaysia  4.2  Chile  -2.9 
Thailand  3.6  Mexico  - 1.0 
The striking  difference  in performance  among the LDCs raises the 
question  of what  role external  factors  have played  directly  or indirectly. 
There  are three  basic, possibly complementary,  hypotheses. The first  is 
that individual  LDCs have simply been affected in different  ways by 
developments in the world economy. But that is only possible to the 
extent that the LDCs differ in their trade structure  or in their initial 
conditions,  especially  in  respect  to indebtedness.  The second  hypothesis 
emphasizes differences in domestic policies, some countries having 
pursued  trade-oriented  policies and moderation  in budget  deficits  while 
others promoted  waste and inefficiency. The third  hypothesis empha- 
sizes a differential  ability  to adapt  to external  shocks or take advantage 
of opportunities  posed by the world  market. 
As shown in table 1, the external  environment  facing the LDCs can 
differ radically over time. LDCs may face high interest rates, low 
inflation,  and weak growth,  as in 1980-82, or they may experience  debt 
liquidation  from  high  inflation  and  a world  boom, as in 1970-73,  or they 
may face a mix such as that prevailing  in 1983-84. Furthermore,  the 
scenarios may differ in that the U.S. dollar may be weak or strong in 
world markets.  The question  then becomes how to evaluate  the impact 
of the different combinations of inflation, interest rates, and OECD 
growth  on a particular  LDC. 
Obviously, it will not be enough  to know that OECD  growth  is, say, 
3 percent to infer the impact of the industrialized  economies on a 
particular  LDC. Various  combinations  of OECD  policy mixes and LDC Rudiger Dornbusch  305 
Table 1.  Key Macroeconomic Variables of the World Economy,  1970-84a 
Average  annual  percentage  rates 
Inflation 
Period  LIBOR  Manufactures  Commodities  OECD  growth 
1970-73  7.6  12.4  14.4  5.9 
1980-82  14.7  -2.4  -  13.3  0.9 
1983-84  10.3  -  1.8  5.2  3.8 
Sources:  Intemational  Monetary Fund, International  Financial  Statistics,  and Data Resources,  Inc. 
a.  LIBOR is the London  interbank offer rate for deposits.  The inflation rate is measured for manufactures by the 
export unit value of exports from industrialized countries and for commodities  by the IMF index for all commodities, 
excluding  oil. 
trade and debt structures can have different interest rate-exchange  rate 
implications that give rise to a number of different outcomes  depending 
on whether the country is heavily indebted to banks and whether it is a 
net exporter or importer of commodities. 
A simple model of a semi-small open economy illustrates these points, 
identifying the channels of external influences and specifying the way in 
which  they  affect  economic  performance.  The  essential  point  of  the 
model is to introduce a sharp distinction between welfare-based assess- 
ments of the linkages between OECD countries and LDCs and the cash- 
flow  models  that are current in the  discussion  of  debt  problems.  Of 
course,  any country is open and thus is affected by external shocks,  a 
point that is discussed in the second section, on economic  structure. The 
third section quantifies external influences. The fourth deals with policy 
issues,  concentrating especially  on the economic  and political sustain- 
ability of debts.  The final section  concludes  that the involuntary debt 
service that is under way is too costly in economic  and political terms to 
continue on its course, without either rationale or target. 
A Framework 
The model set out in this section describes the external influences on 
LDC macroeconomic  variables and welfare.  It emphasizes  the role of 
relative prices, which do not receive prominence in the closed-economy 
U.S.  macroeconomic  tradition,  but  which,  as  is  shown  below,  are 
important in a welfare-theoretic  framework. 
In the model,  the  LDC,  the home  country,  produces  three goods: 
home, or nontraded goods,  which can be thought of as services;  export- 306  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
ables, or manufactures;  and primary  commodities, or materials.2  Do- 
mestic spending  falls on all three of these goods and, in addition, on 
imported manufactures.  The world price of commodities, P,,  and of 
imported manufactures, P*,  is given. I denote by p*  =  P%/P*f  the world 
relative, or real, price of commodities  in terms of manufactures,  which 
the individual  LDC takes as given. Aside from the levels, or paths, of 
these prices, the country  also takes as given the nominal  world interest 
rate on loans, i*. 
The prices of domestic manufactures  and of nontraded  goods are Pm 
andPn,  respectively.  The  world  manufactures  price  is used  as anumeraire 
to define the relative, or real, prices of domestic manufactures  and 
nontraded goods  as Pm =  Pm'P*  and Pn =  P,,!P*,  respectively.  With 
given factor supplies and wage-price flexibility assumed, the supply 
functions  of the three  goods (manufactures,  commodities,  and  nontraded 
goods) are obtained  as functions  of the three relative  prices. 
Equilibrium  in the market  for manufactures  requires  that  supply  equal 
domestic plus foreign  demand.  In the nontraded  goods market,  equilib- 
rium  requires  the equality  of home demand  and supply: 
(1)  QM (Pm, P,19  p*)  =  Dm  (Ping  Prig  P*  y,i*)  + Dm*  (Pin  y*  i*) 
(2)  Qn (Ping Pn, P*)  =  DI, (pm' plv  P  9,  i*), 
where  y denotes real  income. 
In figure  1  the market  equilibrium  schedules  are  labeled,  respectively, 
MM and NN  on the assumption  of gross substitution.  They are drawn 
for given external variables  p*, i*, and y*. Along MM the market  for 
domestic manufactures  clears. An increase in the price of domestic 
manufactures  relative  to the price of those produced  abroad  creates an 
excess supply. To clear the market  the real price of nontraded  goods 
must rise, inducing  substitution  toward manufactures.  A similar  argu- 
ment establishes the slope of the NN  schedule. Point E is the full- 
employment  equilibrium  where  the markets  for nontraded  goods and  for 
home manufactures  clear. There  is no need to look for equilibrium  in the 
market  for commodities, since these face a given price and perfectly 
elastic demand  in world markets. Nor is there a need to worry about 
2. Throughout  I use interchangeably  the terms commodities,  primary  commodities, 
and materials  to designate  goods that  obey, by virtue  of not being  differentiated,  the law 
of one price.  For  concreteness  the reader  might  think  of copper. Rudiger Dornbusch  307 
Figure 1. Equilibrium  Relative Prices 
Domestic manufactures 
Nontraded  goods 
external  balance, since the ability to borrow at a given world interest 
rate  means  that  any current  account  imbalance  can be financed.  Budget 
constraints  are respected, since the behavioral  equations  are derived  by 
maximization  subject  to these constraints. 
The equilibrium  at point E depends on a number of parameters. 
Specifically,  the foreign  parameters  are  the world  real  price  of commod- 
ities, p*, the level of world  income or activity, y*, and the world  rate of 
interest, i*. Equilibrium  also depends on the real value of the external 
debt, since a large  real external  debt reduces real disposable  income. A 
useful special case of the model is the "small country" variant,  which 
arises when substitutability  between home and foreign  manufactures  is 
perfect. In that case, MM in figure 1 is flat because demand  for home 
manufactures  is perfectly  elastic. The special case is an interesting  one 308  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
because  demand  factors  play  no role  and  at least one foreign  determinant 
of domestic  welfare  becomes inoperative.3 
The next question is how changes in these variables  affect the LDC 
in the model. Consider  first  a fall in the world  real  price  of commodities. 
For a producer  of commodities,  lower real  prices lower factor  costs and 
increase  supplies  of both manufactures  and  services. But  the chief effect 
works on the demand  side, where the reduction  in real  income from  the 
worsening  in the terms  of trade  reduces  income and spending,  including 
spending on domestic manufactures  and nontraded  goods. Figure 2 
shows the effect as  a downward shift of both MM  and NN.  The 
equilibrium  real prices of manufactures  and of services must adjust  to 
maintain  full  employment.  The  result  is again  in  external  competitiveness 
in manufacturing  as pm  declines, and a real currency depreciation  as 
measured  by the decline in the real  price  of home goods, Pn. 
When  the LDC is only a consumer,  not a producer,  of commodities, 
the change in the world price will work primarily  via the income effect 
on the demand side.  Any effects on the production side and any 
substitution  effects on the demand side can be assumed secondary to 
the income  effect. When  the home country  is a net importer  of commod- 
ities, lower real commodity prices imply improved terms of trade or 
increased real income. As a result, demand increases for all goods, 
including  home manufactures  and services. A fall in commodity  prices 
therefore  raises the full-employment  real prices of both home manufac- 
tures  and services. 
A rise in world  activity, for given real  commodity  prices, will show in 
the LDC only in the market  for manufactures.  Increased  foreign  income 
and spending  now create an excess demand  so that  the MM schedule  in 
figure  1 shifts up and to the left. The equilibrium  real price of domestic 
manufactures  rises, and  the real  price  of home goods increases. 
The third  disturbance  to consider  is an increase in the world interest 
rate, which, given the path  of prices, depresses borrowing  and spending 
in the LDC in two ways. One is the reduction  in real  disposable  income: 
increased interest rates imply increased debt service and hence a 
3. For  a discussion  of small,  large,  and  semi-large  countries  and  the  policy  implications, 
see William  Branson,  "Economic  Structure  and Policy for External  Balance," in A. W. 
Hooke, ed., Exchange Rate Regimes andPolicy  Interdependence  (International Monetary 
Fund,  1983), pp. 39-74,  and John Williamson,  The Small Country in the World Economy 
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Figure 2.  The Effect of a Decline in Real Commodity  Prices 
Domestic manufactures 
Nontraded  goods 
deterioration  in the intertemporal  terms of trade. The other is the 
conventional substitution  effect of reduced investment and increased 
saving in the face of increased  interest  rates. With  the reduction  in the 
demand  for home manufactures  and  nontraded  goods, both the MM  and 
NN schedules  shift, as in figure  2, leading  to a decline in the equilibrium 
real  prices of both. 
Domestic  real disposable  income, y, is measured  by GNP and thus is 
net of interest payments on the external debt. An increase in world 
interest rates therefore  raises the cost of debt service on floating  rate 
debt and reduces real disposable  income. The same effect occurs from 
an increase in the real value of external  debt due to a once-and-for-all 
fall in the commodity  price level. Increased  real debt from this source 310  Brooktings  Paper  s on Economic  Activity,  2:1985 
depresses spending  and therefore  reduces  the equilibrium  real prices of 
manufactures  and services. In summary,  the analysis identifies three 
principal  channels  of foreign  influence  on the LDC economy: 
-the  real  price  of primary  commodities,  which  is determined  in  world 
markets; 
-the  world  rate  of interest  on the LDC's debts; and 
-the  level of world demand,  which affects demand  for LDC manu- 
factures  exports. 
I now turn  to a welfare-theoretic  analysis  of the effects of changes in 
these external  variables. 
WELFARE  ANALYSIS 
The impact  of external  disturbances  shows in the model entirely via 
changes in the equilibrium  real prices of exportables and nontraded 
goods. Because of wage-price  flexibility, no employment  issues arise. 
Nor do payments problems arise, because budget constraints  are not 
violated, and planned  external  imbalances  can be financed  in the world 
capital market. Nonetheless, external shocks matter  for welfare. The 
appendix  shows that in a two-period  framework  the welfare effects of 
foreign disturbances, measured in terms of current real income and 
denoted  by the term  A  W,  can be summarized  in the following  form: 
(3)  AW  =-E(Midp  + R*M'+'Idp'+')  + K (dR)  -db, 
where  Mi is import  volume 
pi is the relative  price  of imports  in terms  of exports 
R* is the international  real  discount  factor 
b is the real  value of the initial  debt 
K is the initial  debt plus first  period  trade  deficit. 
The equation  quantifies  the impact  of external  disturbances  on wel- 
fare. The first term shows that a terms-of-trade  deterioration  lowers 
welfare. The second term  identifies  the welfare  costs of a change  in the 
real discount  factor. The welfare effect of the terms-of-trade  deteriora- 
tion is proportional  to the level of imports.  The welfare  cost of increased 
real interest  rates is proportional  to the initial  debt plus current  borrow- 
ing. Note that equation  3 uses the real, not the nominal,  interest  rate. I Rudiger Dornbusch  311 
return  to this  issue below in  an  application  of the welfare  change  formula. 
The third  term  measures  the welfare  costs of increases  in the initial  debt 
via a decline in prices or the gain  from  write-offs. 
A rise in interest rates reduces real disposable income and hence 
welfare. Moreover,  adjustment  to increased  real interest  rates involves 
a secondary  burden  via a deterioration  in the terms  of trade.  As domestic 
demand  declines in response to reduced  real income, there  is an excess 
supply of domestic goods and hence unemployment.  Full employment 
can be sustained  only if the real  price  of domestic  manufactures  declines 
in terms  of foreign  manufactures  to increase  competitiveness  and  hence 
world demand for domestic goods. The terms-of-trade  deterioration 
further  worsens welfare by reducing  the purchasing  power of a given 
factor  income.  This  secondary  burden,  familiarfrom  the  transferproblem 
associated  with German reparation payments in the  1920s,4  must arise 
any time a country's factor supplies are put on sale internationally  in 
order to sustain full employment in the face of a fall in income and 
spending. 
How large  this  terms-of-trade  deterioration  would  need  to be depends 
on the pattern  of spending  reduction  in response  to the drop  in disposable 
income, the substitutability  of manufactures  and nontraded  goods at 
home, and the substitutability  between home manufactures  and those 
produced  abroad.  If the spending  cut could  fall  entirely  on foreign  goods, 
there would be no reduction  in spending  on domestic goods and hence 
no unemployed resources. But, of course, part of the reduction in 
spending  will fall on domestic nontraded  goods and on exportables.  To 
make up for the slack, foreign demand for domestic goods must be 
encouraged  by a cut in the real price. The cut must be larger  the less 
substitutability  there  is between home and  foreign  manufactures. 
Exactly  the same  issue of a secondary  burden  occurs in the case of an 
increase in the real price of commodities  in world markets.  The terms- 
of-trade  deterioration  of an  importing  country  means  reduced  real  income 
and hence a cut in spending. A decline in the real price of exports in 
terms of foreign manufactures  will be required  to sustain full employ- 
ment,  thus  further  adding  to the welfare  cost of increased  import  prices. 
In the case of a commodity  exporting  country,  the balance  goes the other 
way: increased  commodity  prices raise  real  income  and  home spending, 
4.  See Robert  A. Mundell,  International  Economics  (Macmillan,  1968). 312  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
and therefore  create tight factor markets  and hence a further  terms-of- 
trade improvement  via increased prices of manufactures  exports. In 
terms  of figure  2, a relatively  flat  MM schedule  minimizes  the secondary 
burden,  while a relatively  steep one makes  it potentially  important.  This 
issue becomes particularly  significant  in the discussion of adjustment 
difficulties  below. 
Equation  3 shows no welfare effects of increased foreign demand. 
Because there are no distortions,  increased  foreign  demand  represents 
a benefit  only to the extent that  it brings  about  a favorable  change  in the 
equilibrium  terms of trade. In the absence of distortions,  international 
effects on home welfare are therefore fully described by the income 
effect associated with price or interest rate changes. There is nothing 
else: all international  influences  are the transfers  implicit  in interest  rate 
and terms-of-trade  changes. Of course, these interest rate or terms-of- 
trade  changes  in turn  will have as their  source  foreign  disturbances  such 
as monetary  or fiscal  policy changes. 
Equation 3 makes the further point that the income effects are 
proportional  to a country's exposure. Higher interest rates reduce 
welfare in proportion  to indebtedness. A terms-of-trade  deterioration 
reduces welfare in proportion to imports. This is one place where 
structural  differences  between countries  come into play. 
AN  APPLICATION 
It is possible now to return  to President  Reagan's remarks  to judge 
whether  in  fact, in  welfare  terms,  there  is a one-for-one  trade-off  between 
extra debt service and extra export revenue. Clearly, in terms of the 
present  analysis, that is not the case. There is such a trade-off  between 
terms-of-trade  improvements  and extra interest, as shown in equation 
3, but not in terms of export revenue. Changes in export revenue can 
reflect  one of two possibilities:  changes in volume at constant  prices or 
changes in revenue from terms-of-trade  changes holding volume con- 
stant. The difference  is crucial, since increased  export volume reflects 
either hard  work or alternative  costs in terms of consumption  forgone, 
while improved  terms  of trade  unquestionably  improve  welfare. 
Table 2 shows a calculation  of the costs and benefits  of interest rate 
and  terms-of-trade  changes  for the group  of nonoil  developing  countries 
for the period  to which the president  referred.  The first  row reports  the Rudiger Dornbusch  313 
Table  2. Cash-Flow  and Welfare  Effects  in Nonoil  LDCs  of Terms-of-Trade  and Interest 
Rate Changes,  1983-84a 
Billions  of dollars  at annual  rate 
Approach  Trade  effect  Debt effect  Net gain 
Cash-flow  39.7  -7.4  32.3 
Welfare  21.5  - 21.0  0.4 
Sources:  IMF, Internationai Financial  Statistics,  and DRI. 
a.  Period  referred to  is  the  first seven  months  of  1984, compared  with  the  same  months  in  1983. See  text  for 
explanation of figures. If the cash-flow approach had used lagged LIBOR rates as in the welfare approach, a positive 
debt effect  would have been obtained because  of a reduction of almost  I percent in the lagged rate over  the period. 
numbers,  at annual  rates, calculated  in the manner  used by President 
Reagan:  growth  in export revenue times the level of LDC exports plus 
debt outstanding  times the increase  in the London  interbank  offer rate, 
or LIBOR  (1.58 percentage  points). The net gain  to LDCs calculated  on 
this basis is shown as $32.3 billion, with trade  gains  far  outweighing  the 
increased  interest  burden. 
The second row shows the calculations  consistent with the welfare 
criterion  in equation  3. These costs and  benefits  arise  from  two sources. 
First, the terms-of-trade  improvement  appears  as a trade  gain of $21.5 
billion, arrived at by multiplying  the percentage improvement  in the 
terms of trade times the initial import level. Because export volume 
growth  is not reckoned,  the trade  gain  comes to only about  one-half  that 
in the first  row. 
The second effect, the welfare cost of the increase in interest rates, 
or the decrease in the real discount factor, is given by initial  debt plus 
the current  account  deficit  times the change in the real discount  factor. 
Because of the large  change in the real discount  factor-a  decline from 
0.90 to 0.83, yielding  a proportional  change  of 7.5 percent-the  welfare 
cost of increased  debt service comes to nearly $39 billion.5  This cost, 
however, is in part  offset by the realized  reduction  in the real value of 
the initial  debt due to the increase in export prices between 1983  and 
1984. Against the cost of $39 billion stands a benefit of $17.8 billion, 
5.  The real discount factor is calculated as R* = [1 + 4 (P,+31P,  )] / (1  +  i*,-6),  where 
P is the export  unit  value  and  i* the three-month  LIBOR  stated  at an annual  rate.  The  real 
discount  factor  uses the  forward  rate  of inflation  but  the  lagged  LIBOR,  since  institutionally 
current  interest  charges  are based  on the six-month  lagged  LIBOR.  The reader  who feels 
cheated  by the use of export  unit  values as a deflator  should  remember  that  equation  3 is 
derived  in this fashion.  Alternatively,  had  import  unit  values been used, given the terms- 
of-trade  improvement,  the shift  in real  interest  rates  would  have been  even higher. 314  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
leaving a total debt cost of $21.0 billion. The net effect corrects for the 
reduction  in the initial  real  value of the debt by realized  capital  gains  but 
takes into account  the income  forward-looking  equivalent  of higher  real 
interest  rates. The second row of table  2 shows that  the debt cost almost 
exactly offsets the terms-of-trade  gain, so that on welfare-based  calcu- 
lation  there  is practically  no change  in welfare,  as against  a sweeping  $32 
billion  change  on the incorrect  calculation.6 
Before leaving these calculations  it is worth emphasizing  the main 
points. First,  there  is no question  that  improvement  in  the terms  of trade, 
not export revenue growth, is the vehicle for welfare improvement. 
Volume, if it matters  at all, must be given a shadow  price. Second, the 
real interest rate, not the nominal  rate, matters  for welfare. Whatever 
questions there might  be about averaging  capital  gains on outstanding 
debt over longer  periods, there  is no question  that  welfare  is affected  by 
the real rate, which is the intertemporal  terms of trade. The exact 
numbers  in table 2 are surely sensitive to the exact time period, since 
the export  price series is highly  variable.  The interest  of the calculation 
therefore  lies in demonstrating  principles,  not in welfare  judgments  for 
a particular  historical  period. 
The welfare analysis so far assumes the complete absence of distor- 
tions that may modify  in an important  way the welfare  criterion.  Up to 
this point, terms-of-trade  changes, capital gains or losses,  and real 
interest  rate  changes  are the only determinants  of welfare  change. From 
that perspective there has been little change in welfare. The analytical 
framework  and welfare calculations show that comparing  increased 
export revenue with the cost of increased  debt service due to nominal 
interest rate changes makes no sense whatsoever. I now turn  to quali- 
fications that arise from credit rationing and imperfect wage-price 
flexibility. 
COMPLICATIONS 
Foreign  disturbances  have additional  effects on home welfare when 
they interact  with distortions  in the competitive  allocation  of resources. 
6. The nonoil  LDC's  initial  conditions  used in the calculation  are  the following:  initial 
debt (floating  rate) is assumed to be $470 billion; exports, $324 billion;  imports, $370 
billion;  and  the  current  account  deficit,  $50  billion.  Terms-of-trade  improvement  is assumed 
to be 5.8 percent;  and  an increase  in export  prices  between 1983  and 1984  (average  of the 
first  seven months  in each period),  3.8 percent.  The percentage  change  in the real  discount 
factor is dR*lR*  =  100 (0.83  -  0.897)/0.897  =  7.47 percent. Rudiger  Dornbusch  315 
These distortions may take the form of tariffs or quotas, imperfect 
competition, or departures  from constant returns  to scale. They may 
also exist in the world  capital  market.  Access to credit  may be rationed 
so that the productivity  of capital  and the marginal  rate of substitution 
between  present  and  future  consumption  diverge  from  the world  interest 
rate.  Less than  full  wage-price  flexibility  is a separate  source  of distortion. 
In principle  it is possible to adapt  the welfare criterion  in equation  3 
to the case of distortions.  The  result,  however, is specific  to the  particular 
distortion  at hand, so that there is no general  case. Except for the case 
of credit  rationing,  which I use for illustrative  purposes,  I therefore  limit 
the discussion  to the direction  in which these distortions  tilt the welfare 
change rather than presenting formulas or outright estimates. As a 
general rule, the effect is to complement  the terms-of-trade  and debt 
effects already  discussed. 
For  a simple  illustration  of the welfare  implications  of credit  rationing, 
I assume that credit rationing  is the only distortion  and that initial  debt 
is zero. As the appendix  shows, the welfare  change  is now: 
(3a)  A\W =-E  Midpi  - R*  (I  -  zy)  E Mi+ ldpit+ 
+  (1  Y)  J(  R)  +  'ydJ, 
where  -y  denotes  the ratio  of the domestic  discount  factor  under  rationing 
to the international  discount factor  R*. Hence -y  is a positive fraction, 
since the shadow  rate of interest  under  rationing  exceeds that available 
in the world market  under  unrestricted  borrowing.  The term  J denotes 
the first period current account deficit, which is restricted by credit 
rationing.  The term J thus denotes the available credit line, and it is 
assumed  that  the credit  constraint  is effective. 
The revised welfare criterion takes into account that under credit 
rationing  there is insufficient  consumption-smoothing  and insufficient 
investment.  The welfare effects of rationing  appear  in two ways. First, 
a relaxation  of existing  rationing  yields an increase  in welfare  by raising 
the level of current  consumption  and  of investment,  the activities  whose 
domestic  valuation  exceeds the world  cost. This effect is captured  in the 
term -ydJ.  The resulting  improvement  in domestic demand  leads to an 
improvement  in the terms  of trade  that  further  increases  the welfare  gain 
of the reduced  restriction.  Second, the presence of rationing  increases 
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The importance  of credit rationing  becomes particularly  clear in the 
case of cyclical fluctuations  in the terms  of trade.  Equation  3 shows that 
in the absence  of any distortion  a small  deterioration  in the current  terms 
of trade  can be offset by a future  improvement  of equal size (including 
interest), with welfare unchanged. But when credit is rationed the 
smoothing  of consumption  that  makes  for  a zero  net  welfare  effect cannot 
take place. As a result, terms-of-trade  fluctuations  become costly, as 
seen in equation 3a, where a future terms-of-trade  improvement  is 
weighted by the factor (1 -  y) R*, being discounted at the shadow 
interest  rate. In this case, the offsetting  future  terms-of-trade  improve- 
ment  must  be larger  than  the current  deterioration. 
When  credit  is rationed,  transitory  disturbances  cannot  be optimally 
adjusted  to by borrowing.  Too much  of the real  income  deterioration  has 
to be absorbed  by cuts in current  consumption  and  investment;  too little, 
by borrowing.  The costs go further  in this sense: because  credit  rationing 
restricts current consumption and investment, it causes an adverse 
shock to translate  into a larger  reduction  in the real price of domestic 
manufactures.  Thus the secondary burdens  of adverse shocks tend to 
be enlarged.  By contrast,  favorable  shocks tend  to have larger  beneficial 
welfare effects, since they tend to reduce the marginal  welfare cost of 
credit  rationing. 
Less than  full wage-price  flexibility  implies  that adverse shocks lead 
to unemployment.  When  a cut in real  disposable  income  leads  to reduced 
spending  on domestic goods, the spending  cuts translate  into reduced 
production  and employment,  which feed on themselves with multiplier 
effects. In the case of transitory  shocks, the high  costs of credit  rationing 
emerge  once more, because they imply that a fall in current  disposable 
income results in more unemployment  and a larger  loss in welfare  than 
would be the case with unrestricted  borrowing. 
FOREIGN  DEMAND 
The next question is whether distortions  affect the role that foreign 
demand plays in relation to home welfare. As noted above, in the 
undistorted  case, an increase in foreign demand  raises welfare only to 
the extent that it leads to an increase in the equilibrium  real price of 
exportables. The increase in export earnings  holding  volume constant 
fully accounts for the benefits of the shock. Any increase in export 
volume  itself leads to no benefit  in this undistorted  case. Rudiger  Dornbusch  317 
Once distortions  are introduced,  an increase  in foreign  demand  does 
carry extra welfare benefits. If the home export sector is imperfectly 
competitive,  price  exceeds marginal  cost. An increase  in  foreign  demand 
will raise  welfare  by the profit  margin  times the increase  in sales volume. 
Now, because, by definition,  the imperfect  competitor  underproduces, 
the export  sector  will be able  to increase  sales without  sacrificing  profits. 
With  imperfect  wage flexibility,  increased  foreign  demand  dispenses 
with the need to use domestic exchange rate or fiscal policies, which 
may  themselves  be costly or even impossible  to achieve, to maintain  full 
employment. For example, a devaluation, because of its inflationary 
impact,  may appear  as an excess burden  of adjustment  to a disturbance. 
Here is perhaps  the most important  role for foreign demand. If policy 
obstacles or inflexibility  prevents  relative  price changes  that assure  full 
employment, then foreign demand can fill the gap and avoid excess 
costs. 
A decline in foreign demand, of course, reduces welfare. Such a 
decline might  occur as a result of a recession abroad,  but it might  also 
occur as a result of protection. In either event, lower world demand 
leads to a deterioration  in an LDC's terms of trade  and hence a loss in 
welfare.  The issue arises in a particularly  forceful  way when an adverse 
shock forces a deterioration  in the LDC's full-employment  terms of 
trade, to which developed countries respond by tariffs, which in turn 
further  depress  the terms  of trade. 
Credit  rationing  does not give foreign  demand  a special role, as can 
be noted from equation 3a. It might be thought that credit rationing 
implies  a foreign  exchange  shortage  that  is mitigated  by increased  foreign 
demand.  But, in fact, as long as there  is full wage-price  flexibility,  there 
is nothing  special about foreign exchange: resources are fungible, and 
credit rationing  implies a shortage of current resources, not foreign 
resources. Thus foreign  demand  issues come into their  own only when 
resources are not fungible or when it is costly to pursue resource 
reallocation. 
Once distortions  are present because LDCs are constrained  in their 
borrowing  ability  or because  domestic  wage-price  problems  enhance  the 
value of foreign exchange, the welfare calculations need amending. 
Clearly  the net costs reported  in table 2 now will be less. If the shadow 
price of an extra dollar  of foreign  exchange is sufficiently  high, growth 
in export volume can make a decisive difference  to welfare, and there 
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that  lead to a high  shadow  price  also argue  against  rapid  servicing  of the 
debt and in favor of loans. One cannot on the same welfare criterion 
claim that export volume growth improves  welfare and that LDCs are 
better off reducing their debt rapidly. To do so is to sanction credit 
rationing  as not being  costly. The primary  reason  export  volume  matters 
in the case of credit rationing  is that increased volume permits extra 
credit  and  improves  access to foreign  exchange.  Given  foreign  exchange, 
a country  can expand  current  demand  to use its resources  fully. 
A final caveat concerning  foreign demand is this: foreign demand 
growth  certainly  cannot  hurt;  it improves  the terms  of trade  and  profits. 
But export  volume  growth  need not necessarily  reflect  growth  in foreign 
demand.  It can  just as well be a reflection  of a domestic recession or of 
forced and premature  debt service. Thus strong  export volume growth 
cannot  automatically  be treated  as an  improvement  in  welfare,  and  under 
no circumstances  as a one-for-one trade-off, as is so often done in a 
simple  counting  of export  revenue. 
The Structure of LDC Trade and Debt 
The preceding section has identified the channels through which 
foreign disturbances  affect LDC welfare. This section examines the 
trade  and debt structure  of individual  LDCs to see which disturbances 
are likely to be important  for which particular  country or group of 
countries. 
TRADE  STRUCTURE 
The terms of trade is one potentially  important  channel of external 
influence  on domestic welfare. In particular,  changes in the world real 
price of primary  commodities  are important  for those countries  that  are 
either  large  net importers  or net exporters.  The same argument  applies, 
of course, not only to primary  commodities,  but also to petroleum. 
Before the 1960s, LDCs tended to export primary  commodities  and 
import  manufactures.  That picture  has changed  in two respects. First, 
petroleum  has assumed  a large  share  in many  countries'  trade. Second, 
in a longer term trend, the LDC import share of manufactures  has 
dropped, while the manufactures  share in exports has grown. Latin 
America  comes closest to the traditional  picture,  with  primary  commod- Rudiger Dornbusch  319 
Table  3. Trade  Structure  for Selected  LDCs  in 1980-81a 
Percent  of total exports or imports 
Exports  Imports 
Manu-  Commod-  Manu-  Commod- 
Country  factures  Oil  ities  factures  Oil  ities 
Argentina  21  4  75  72  10  18 
Brazil  35  5  60  34  51  15 
Chile  14  1  85  51  21  28 
Mexico  12  67  21  49  2  49 
Indonesia  3  79  18  60  13  27 
Korea  81  1  12  39  30  31 
Malaysia  20  27  53  59  17  24 
Thailand  25  0  75  48  30  22 
Source:  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,  Handbook of International Trade andDevelopment 
Statistics,  1984 Supplement  (U.N.,  1984). 
a.  Manufactures exclude  SITC 67 and 68, which are ores and metals. 
ities accounting  for 40.5 percent  of exports, manufactures  for nearly  60 
percent  of imports.  Asia departs  furthest,  with manufactures  represent- 
ing nearly  50 percent  of total  exports. Table  3 shows trade  structures  for 
individual  countries  to identify  more  precisely the range  of differences. 
Korea and Argentina  represent  the extremes, with Korea looking "in- 
dustrialized"  and  more  like  Japan,  and  Argentina  resembling  a traditional 
LDC. 
The link between LDC trade structure  and the analytical  results of 
the preceding  section is complicated  by the fact that, for some LDCs, 
intermediate  products play an important  role in trade. For example, 
Brazil's  manufactures  exports  include  frozen  orangejuice  and  processed 
soya, both  of which  have a substantial  primary  commodity  content. The 
prices  of these manufactures  will therefore  move significantly  with  those 
of primary  commodities  rather  than  with manufactures  of industrialized 
countries. By contrast, Korea's manufactures  contain a much higher 
percentage  of labor  value added  and  therefore  are much  less sensitive to 
primary  commodity  prices. These facts are important  to bear in mind 
later when it is shown that there are no uniform  linkages between the 
real  price  of commodities  and  particular  LDC terms  of trade. 
EXTERNAL  DEBT 
A second major source of external influence on the LDCs is the 
interest  rate  on external  debt. In the analytical  model,  changes  in interest 320  Brookings Paper-s on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
Table 4.  External Debt Characteristics of LDC Regions in 1984a 
Percent unless  otherwise  specified 
Total  debt  Ratios 
(billions  Debt-  Debt-  Interest- 
Region  of dollars)  exports  GDP  exports 
Latin America  351.1  280  46.0  28.9 
Africa  126.8  162  39.8  11.3 
Asia  210.9  86  23.7  6.0 
Source:  IMF,  World Economic  Outlook, 1985 (IMF, April 1985), tables 45, 48, and 49. 
a.  Exports  denotes  exports  of goods  and services.  Debt includes long and short term. 
Table 5.  External Debt and Debt Service for Selected LDCs in  1984a 
Percent unless  otherwise  specified 
Total  debt  Ratios 
(billions  Debt-  Bank debt-  Interest 
Country  of dollars)  exports  Debt-GDP  total debt  rate 
Argentina  47.8  483  70.6  67.0  11.8 
Brazil  102.2  338  48.8  77.0  11.7 
Chile  20.4  424  89.1  66.7  11.0 
Mexico  96.7  309  60.5  79.9  12.5 
Indonesia  30.9  150  37.3  46.0  6.9 
Korea  45.0  134  53.6  68.7  9.2 
Malaysia  18.1  95  55.4  61.9  7.2 
Thailand  14.7  154  35.0  50.5  10.0 
Sources:  Unpublished  data from Morgan Guaranty, and IMF, Initernationial  Finiancial Statistics. 
a.  The  effective  interest  rate is estimated  as interest payments  expressed  as a fraction of  debt outstanding.  The 
debt-export  ratio for Indonesia  refers to  1983. 
rates change welfare in proportion  to the stock of debt outstanding. 
Table 4 shows data for outstanding  debts, absolutely and relative to 
exports and GDP, for three regions. The table also reports interest 
payments  as a fraction  of exports, a measure  that, in conjunction  with 
the debt-export ratio, gives an idea of how debt is divided between 
official  debt at concessional  or fixed  rates  and  bank  debt, which  tends to 
be serviced  at a market-linked  floating  rate. 
The table brings out the large regional  differences in indebtedness 
and thus highlights  the importance  of interest rate shocks in helping 
explain differential  performance.  Table 5 shows the data in a more 
disaggregated  form  and  includes  an estimate  of the effective interest  rate 
paid by each country  on external  debt. This effective rate is calculated 
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average  over the various  kinds  of debt: short-term  and long-term,  bank 
and official, dollar  and shekel. It can be compared  with a 1984  average 
LIBOR  rate  of 10.5  percent. 
The  detailed  comparison  shows  that  major  borrowers  in  Latin  America 
have a significantly  higher  share  of bank  debt and  a much  larger  ratio  of 
debt to exports or GDP than do Asian countries. The higher average 
interest  rate  also reflects,  presumably,  much  higher  spreads  over LIBOR 
than is the case for Asia. As a result, Latin America's exposure to 
interest  rate  shocks is much  greater  than  that  of Asia. 
The informal  table below combines the different  elements to sum- 
marize  the differences  in structure  with respect to trade  and debt in the 
group  of nonoil  LDCs. The  effect of macroeconomic  events in the OECD 
countries on LDCs will vary, depending on each country's peculiar 
debtor-trader  make-up. 
Ratio of bank debt to exports 
High  Medium  Low 
Net exporters of materials  Brazil  Peru  Sri Lanka 
Net importers  of materials  Chile  Korea  Hong Kong 
Quantifying  the Linkages 
From the conceptual  framework  and the trade and debt structure,  I 
now turn  to an attempt  to quantify  the linkages  between OECD  macro- 
economics  and  the LDCs. The paradigm  of performance  linkages  during 
the 1950s  and 1960s  was "trade  as an engine of growth." The potential 
of trade  to transmit  growth  from  rich  to poor countries  is emphasized  in 
the Nurkse-Haberler-Lewis  approach, although the adequacy of the 
transmission  and its persistence  have at various  times been questioned. 
Thus W. Arthur  Lewis has documented  the growth transmission  but 
also argued  the need for auxiliary  engines of growth, such as import 
substitution  at the national  or regional  level, if the LDCs are to continue 
growing  at satisfactory  rates.7  Still, the broad  pattern  in the economic 
7. See W. Arthur  Lewis, "The Slowing  Down of the Engine  of Growth,"  American 
Economic  Review, vol. 70 (September  1980),  pp. 555-64; I. B. Kravis, "Trade  as the 
Handmaiden  of Growth:  Similarities  between  the Nineteenth  and  Twentieth  Centuries," 
Economic  Journal,  vol. 80  (December  1970),  pp. 850-72;  Lloyd  G. Reynolds,  "The  Spread 
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relationship  between LDCs and the OECD  countries  is summarized  by 
the fact that sustained high economic growth at the center promotes 
growth  at the periphery. 
Table 6 shows the results of three regressions testing the relation 
between the growth  of real gross domestic product  in the nonoil LDCs 
and  the growth  rate  of OECD  countries.  The equations  differ  in that  they 
use alternative  measures  of OECD  growth, namely  the growth  rates of 
industrial  production, real GDP, and import volume, as explanatory 
variables.  In  each  case the explanatory  variable  is entered  as a distributed 
lag. 
These regressions  confirm  that sustained  growth  in the OECD  coun- 
tries spreads  to LDCs and raises growth  there. The precise magnitude 
of the impact  is quite open, and so is the question  of which of the three 
measures of  OECD growth is  the best indicator of  the  spread of 
prosperity.  Import  growth  is certainly  too limited  a measure,  because it 
entirely  leaves out  the role  played  by international  capital  flows  to LDCs, 
which are themselves a by-product of the spreading  prosperity. As 
OECD  growth  touches LDCs, their  external  balance  position  improves, 
or their creditworthiness  as of given debts is enhanced. As a result, 
access to more  capital  becomes  available,  which  in turn  makes  it possible 
to finance  growth-enhancing  policies of investment  even if these projects 
have large  import  content. 
This broad  approach  uses OECD growth as a proxy for the several 
separate  channels,  including  interest  rates  and  the  terms  of trade,  through 
which OECD  macroeconomics  exerts an effect on the LDCs. But since 
the trade  and  debt structure  differs  from  one LDC to another,  and since 
the same  growth  rate  for the aggregate  OECD  is consistent  with  different 
interest  rates, exchange  rates, and commodity  prices, it is necessary to 
look at the more disaggregated  linkages, taking each of the channels 
identified  above in turn. 
THE  TERMS  OF  TRADE 
One of the old questions in LDC-industrial country discussions 
concerns the terms of trade of the periphery.  That question was well 
vol. 21 (September  1983),  pp. 941-80;  and  James  Riedel, "Trade  as the Engine  of Growth 
in Developing  Countries,  Revisited,"  Economic  Journal,  vol. 94 (March  1984),  pp. 56-73. 
The older  literature  includes  in particular  Ragnar  Nurkse, Patterns  of Trade  and Devel- 
opment  (Stockholm:  Almquist  and  Wicksell,  1959),  and  Gottfried  Haberler,  International 
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Table 6.  Trade as the Engine of Growth in Nonoil LDCs,  1961-84a 
Summary  statistic 
Measure  of  OECD  Durbin- 
OECD  growth  Constant  growth  Rho  R2  Watson 
Industrial production  2.25  0.76  0.46  0.49  1.72 
(2.54) 
Real GDP  3.37  0.34  0.50  0.51  1.80 
(2.80) 
Import  volume  2.90  0.28  0.44  0.56  1.85 
(2.98) 
a.  The  dependent  variable is growth  of  real GDP in nonoil  LDCs.  Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics.  The 
explanatory  variables are entered as distfibuted  lags. The table reports the sums of the estimated  coefficients. 
defined when the periphery  was an area in which raw materials  were 
produced and the center was producing manufactures. With trade 
patterns  so clearly  defined,  it made  sense to ask how the gains  from  trade 
are shared  between rich and  poor countries.  These themes were partic- 
ularly  developed in the context of the challenge  to the classical theory 
of the gains from trade offered by the Prebisch-Singer  thesis, which 
argues that LDCs are particularly  exposed as exporters of materials.8 
Specifically,  the argument  is that  a cyclical downturn  in OECD  countries 
reduces real commodity  prices sharply,  because both the demand  and 
supply  price elasticities are low in the short run. In the longer  run, real 
commodity  prices are said to decline because of low income elasticities 
of demand  and high  growth  rates of productivity  on the supply  side. 
Today it is no longer  the case that LDCs are uniformly  producers  of 
materials  and importers  of manufactures.  Hence their  terms of trade- 
the  ratio  of export  to import  prices-no  longer  merely  reflect  the  behavior 
of the real price of commodities in terms of manufactures.  Figure 3 
makes  that  point by showing  two series. The solid line shows the terms 
of trade of all nonoil LDCs, while the dashed line represents the 
Economist  index of commodities  (excluding  oil) deflated  by the export 
price  index of industrialized  countries.9 
The two series share some of the major  trends, but there are differ- 
8. See H. W. Singer, "The Terms  of Trade  Controversy  and the Evolution  of Soft 
Financing:  Early  Years  in  the U.N.," in Gerald  M. Meier  and  Dudley  Seers,  eds., Pioneers 
in  Development  (Oxford  University  Press, 1984),  pp.  275-303;  and  Report  by the  Secretary 
General of  Unctad,  Toward a New  Trade Policy  for Development  (New  York:  United 
Nations, 1964).  See also John  Spraos,  Inequalising  Trade? (Clarendon  Press, 1983). 
9. The export  price  of industrialized  countries  is represented  by the export  unit  value. 
The  export  unit  value  matches  closely the behavior  of manufactures  prices  in world  trade. 324  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
Figure 3.  The Nonoil LDCs' Terms of Trade and the Real Commodity  Price, 
1974:1-1985:  la 
Index,  1980 =  100 
Sources:  The Econiomist, and International Monetary Fund, Internzationlal  Finlanicial  Statistics. 
a.  The  real commodity  price is the Economist  index of commodities  deflated by industrial countries'  unit export 
values.  Terms of trade are exports  unit value index divided by imports unit value index. Terms-of-trade data extend 
through 1984:3. 
ences, for example in 1979-80, in the behavior and certainly in the 
magnitude  of swings. Part  of the difference  is accounted  for by oil prices, 
which  enter  the terms-of-trade,  but  not the real  commodity  price, series. 
But in the main  the lack of conformity  of the two series arises from the 
fact that the terms  of trade  simply  are no longer  tantamount  to the ratio 
of commodity  to manufactures  prices. In  fact, figure  3 makes  it clear  that 
the LDCs' terms of trade are much more stable than the real price of 
commodities. 
Table  7 investigates  the determinants  of the terms  of trade  by means 
of three regressions. The first regression shows results for all nonoil 
LDCs; the second and  third,  for Brazil  and Korea. Using quarterly  data Rudiger  Dornbusch  325 
Table 7.  The Determinants of the Terms of Trade for Nonoil LDCs,  1973:1-1984:3a 
Real  nonoil  Summaty  statistic 
commodity  Real price  Durbin- 
Country  Constant  price  of oil  Rho  R2  Watson 
All nonoil LDCs  3.39  0.30  -0.09  0.89  0.94  2.09 
(3.62)  (-3.50) 
Brazil  7.51  0.81  -0.26  0.76  0.88  2.24 
(3.59)  (-2.79) 
Korea  3.04  -0.22  -0.10  0.90  0.92  1.83 
(-2.58)  (-2.71) 
a.  The dependent  variable is log (terms of trade).  Independent  variables are logs.  Numbers  in parentheses  are t- 
statistics.  All  regressions  corrected  for  first order  serial  correlation.  For  Brazil  the  export  unit  value  is  that of 
noncoffee  exports.  The  explanatory  variables  are entered  as  distributed  lags.  The  table  reports  the  sums  of  the 
estimated  coefficients. 
for the period 1973:1-1984:3,  I regressed  the level of the log of the terms- 
of-trade  index  (TOT)  on the log of the real  nonoil  commodity  or materials 
price (RMP),  and on the log of the real  price of oil in terms  of industrial 
countries'  export  unit values (ROP). 
Even though  LDCs now have manufactures  on both the export and 
import  side and  the net impact  of the commodities-manufactures  relative 
price, RMP, is opposite in Brazil and Korea, a rise in the real price of 
commodities  improves  the group's  terms  of trade.  But the elasticity  now 
is relatively  small, only 0.21. The real  price of oil enters with a negative 
sign, since  this  group  is made  up  of net  importers  of oil. Here  the elasticity 
for the group  is even smaller. 
Note that  for Brazil  and Korea, both oil-importing  countries,  the real 
price  of oil appears  with a negative  coefficient. But  for Brazil  and  Korea 
real  material  prices have elasticities  of opposite signs, reflecting  the fact 
that the former  is a net exporter, whereas the latter is a net importer. 
The elasticity  estimates  also differ  significantly  in size: Brazil's  terms  of 
trade are much more responsive to both real oil and real commodity 
prices than  are those of Korea. 
The difference  between these two countries is strongly  brought  out 
in figure  4, which shows for Brazil  a sharp  terms-of-trade  deterioration 
in the 1977-81  period. The series shown in the diagram  includes coffee 
and reflects the 1976-77 coffee boom in a sharp terms-of-trade  im- 
provement for Brazil. For Korea the decline in commodity prices at 
the end of the 1970s  offsets the second oil shock, whereas for Brazil it 
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Figure 4.  The Terms of Trade of Korea and Brazil, 1973:1-1985:1a 
Index,  1980  =  100 
Source:  IMF, International Financial  Statistics. 
a.  Defined  as  price of  exports  divided  by price of imports (unit value  index),  and calculated  as a three-quarter 
centered  moving average.  Data for Brazil extend  through  1984:4. 
THE  REAL  PRICE  OF  COMMODITIES 
The question now is what determines  the real price of commodities. 
Figure  5 shows quarterly  data  since 1960  for  the  real  price  of commodities 
in terms  of the export  unit values of industrialized  countries.  These are 
close but not identical to the manufactures  unit value. Shown on the 
horizontal  axis are the peaks and troughs  of the international  business 
cycle derived  for the seven major  industrialized  countries  by Geoffrey 
Moore and Victor Zarnowitz.'0  The timing  of movements in real com- 
modity prices corresponds broadly to the business cycle.  But that 
correspondence  is not  always  exact. Moreover,  there  are  some  instances, 
10. See Geoffrey  H. Moore  and  Victor  Zarnowitz,  "The  Development  and  Role of the 
National  Bureau's  Business  Cycle Chronologies,"  Working  Paper  1394  (National  Bureau 












4- 328  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
for example, 1978, where a dip in the real commodity price has no 
counterpart  in the business cycle. In fact, 1978 was a year of strong 
expansion  in world  industrial  production. 
Table 8 shows the trough-to-peak  change in both world industrial 
production and real commodity prices. Real commodity prices are 
measured  alternatively  by the Economist and the IMF index of prices 
for all commodities, in each case deflated  by the industrial  countries' 
export unit value. The table demonstrates  that the cyclical factor by 
itself is not sufficient  to explain the behavior of commodity  prices: in 
some recoveries real prices fall, and across recoveries the rates of 
increase  differ  widely. 
Commodity prices can, however, be explained by a model that 
includes  two other  determinants  of real  commodity  prices. One  is supply- 
side factors  for individual  commodities,  which affect both the trend  and 
the short-run  volatility of the prices. For example, between 1975  and 
1978  the price of coffee tripled,  and even though  the share of coffee in 
the overall  index  is small,  the price  explosion  affects  the aggregate  index. 
The other is the real exchange rate of the U.S. dollar. A strengthening 
of the dollar  tends to lower the real  price of commodities. 
Equation  4 reports a regression  using quarterly  data for the period 
1970:2  to 1984:4  of the rate of change of real commodity  prices (RMP) 
on the rate  of appreciation  of the U.S. dollar  (RDOL)  and  on the growth 
rate  of industrial  production  of the OECD  (ACT).  "' 
(4)  RMP=  -1.44  +  2.07ACT  -  0.82RDOL 
(-2.06)  (3.56)  (-1.94) 
R2 =  0.35; Durbin-Watson  =  1.90. 
The equation  confirms  the expected positive effect of OECD  growth 
on real commodity prices. More surprising  is the effect of the real 
exchange rate appreciation.  That effect in different specifications is 
invariably  negative, although it is not always significant.  One would 
expect changes in the dollar  exchange rate to affect the nominal  prices 
of both commodities  and  manufactured  goods in world  trade  in the same 
11. The U.S. real exchange  rate is given by the IMF's index of relative  value-added 
deflators  in manufacturing;  industrial  production,  by the IMF's  index  for  all  industrialized 
countries.  The regression  is run  in first  differences  with  the explanatory  variables  entered 
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Table 8.  Cyclical Behavior of Real Commodity Prices,  1958:2-1980:la 
Percentage  change, trough  to peak 
Industrial  Real nonoil 
Cycle  production  in  commodity  prices 
Trough  Peak  industrialized  Economist  IMF 
quarter  quarter  countries  index  index 
1958:2  1960:1  21.5  -  1.9  -0.1 
1961:1  1962:1  10.4  -  2.7  -  1.6 
1963:1  1966:1  26.3  18.0  10.8 
1967:4  1969:3  14.3  -  3.4  4.7 
1971:3  1973:4  19.5  74.0  40.9 
1975:2  1980:1  30.6  10.1  15.9 
Sources:  Geoffrey H. Moore and Victor Zarnowitz, "The Development  and Role of the National Bureau's Business 
Cycle  Chronologies,"  Working Paper 1394 (National  Bureau of Economic  Research,  July  1984); IMF, Initernational 
Financial  Statistics;  and DRI. 
a.  Commodity  prices are deflated by the industrial countries'  exports  unit value. 
direction,  not to change the real price of commodities.  A dollar  appre- 
ciation  would  be expected  to lower  the  purchasing  power  of commodities 
in terms of U.S.  goods while raising it in terms of other industrial 
countries' output, with no significant  net effect. The presence of a 
negative  coefficient, however, suggests that on balance  the purchasing 
power  of commodities  declines  in  terms  of manufactures.  An explanation 
of that effect requires  a more complete model of the purchasing  power 
of commodities in terms of the goods of the United States and other 
industrialized  countries.  12 
A Model. The world market for commodities is  assumed to be 
integrated.  There  are two consuming  regions, the United States and the 
12. For empirical  work on commodity  prices, see Barry  P. Bosworth  and Robert  Z. 
Lawrence, Commodity Prices and the NewInflation  (Brookings, 1982);  Richard N. Cooper 
and  Robert  Z. Lawrence,  "The 1972-75  Commodity  Boom," BPEA,  3:1975,  pp. 671-715; 
Ke-Young  Chu  and  Thomas  K. Morrison,  "The 1981-82  Recession  and  Non-Oil  Primary 
Commodity  Prices," IMF Staff Papers, vol. 31 (March 1984), pp. 93-140; Andrew 
Feltenstein,  Morris  Goldstein,  and Susan M. Schadler,  "A Multilateral  Exchange  Rate 
Model  for Primary  Producing  Countries,"  IMF Staff Papers, vol. 26 (September  1979), 
pp. 543-82; and A. Steven Englander,  "Commodity  Prices in the Current  Recovery," 
Federal Reserve Bank of New  York  Quarterly Review, vol.  10 (Spring 1985), pp. 11-19. 
The  role of the U.S. real  exchange  rate  in influencing  commodity  prices  is emphasized 
in Rudiger  Dornbusch, "Flexible Exchange Rates and Interdependence,"  IMF Staff 
Papers, vol. 30 (March  1983),  pp. 3-30; Jeffrey  Sachs, "Macroeconomic  Policies in the 
OECD and LDCs' External  Adjustment"  (Harvard  University, September  1984),  and 
"The  Dollar  and  the  Policy  Mix:  1985,  "  BPEA,  1:1  985,  pp. 117-85;  and  Rudiger  Dornbusch, 
"The Effects of OECD  Macroeconomic  Policies  on Non-Oil  LDCs:  A Review" (Massa- 
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rest of the world.  The rest of the world  is always  viewed as "the" foreign 
country and denoted by an asterisk. World demand  for commodities 
depends  on the real  price of commodities  in terms  of the GDP deflators 
in  each  of the two regions  and  on real  activity.  The supply  of commodities 
is assumed  exogenous. 
(5)  S =  D(p  Y) + D* (p*, Y* 
where 
Y, Y* are domestic  and  foreign  activity 
Pc, P* are commodity  prices in home and  foreign  currency 
P, P* are the domestic and foreign  deflators  in the respective curren- 
cies. 
It is assumed that materials  or commodity  prices are arbitraged  so 
that  their  price, measured  in dollars,  is spatially  equalized: 
(6)  Pc  ePC*. 
The U.S. real  exchange  rate  is defined  as the ratio  of the U.S. deflator 
(in manufacturing)  to the deflator  of U.S. trading  partners,  measured  in 
dollars,  P/eP*. When  equation  6 is substituted  in equation  5, the solution 
for the real commodity  price in terms of activity, supply, and the real 
exchange  rate  is: 
(7)~  PC = H  Y  Y* 
eP;S),  HI, H2  > 0; H3 <  O.  P  e 
The model is shown in figure  6. The schedule D  +  D* represents 
world  demand,  drawn  for a given real  exchange  rate  and  a given level of 
world  activity. The initial  equilibrium  real  price is (Pc/P)O. 
The model implies  that an increase in activity raises real commodity 
prices. This is the cyclical effect that until recently was the major 
macroeconomic  effect noted  in work  on commodity  prices. But equation 
5 also shows a role for the real exchange  rate:  a real appreciation  of the 
U.S. dollar  will  lower  real  commodity  prices  in terms  of the U.S. deflator 
while raising  them  in terms  of foreign  deflators. 
The result can be understood  in the following terms. Suppose the 
GDP deflator  in each country  is given and the exchange  rate moves. At 
a given domestic price of commodities  the real price at home would be Rudiger Dornbusch  331 
Figure 6.  World Commodity  Market 
Relative  price 
Quantity 
unchanged.  But with the dollar  appreciation,  the foreign  price of com- 
modities is now higher  and so is the real price abroad. Consequently, 
quantity  demand  abroad  declines, and  there  is a world  excess supply,  as 
shown by the downward  shift of the world  demand  schedule  in figure  6. 
To restore equilibrium  the real price in terms of the U.S. deflator  must 
fall to (Pc/P)1. 
Moreover,  from  equation  5, the percentage  change  in the equilibrium 
price due to a real  dollar  appreciation  is equal  to: 
Iln(c)  13* 
(8)  (  p  )  (,8N +  ,3*T1) 332  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
Figure 7.  The Real Price of Commodities, United States and Germany, 
1970:1-1985:  la 
Index,  1980 =  100 
Sources:  Same as figure 3. 
a.  The real price of commodities  here is expressed  in terms of the respective  countries'  GNP deflator. 
where -q and -q* are the domestic and foreign price elasticities of 
commodity  demand  and I8  and 3* are the shares of the home country 
and the rest of the world in total demand.  The elasticity of equilibrium 
price in terms of the U.S. deflator  therefore  must be a fraction. With 
equal demand  elasticities, the elasticity reduces to the foreign share in 
world demand.  '3 
This  effect has nothing  to do with  commodities  being  priced  in dollars. 
It is simply an implication  of a flexible price model for commodities 
combined  with an assumed change in the real exchange rate. Figure 7 
shows striking  evidence of the divergent  movements  of the real price of 
13. The  equilibrium  price  behaves  as if commodities  were  priced  in  terms  of a currency 
basket. See William  H. Branson  and Louka T. Katseli, "Currency  Baskets and Real 
Effective  Exchange  Rates," in Mark  Gersovitz  and  others, eds., The  Theory  and Experi- 
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Table  9. The Determinants  of the Real Commodity  Price, United  States, 1970:2-1985:la 
Real  World  Real  Summary  statistic 
exchlange  industrial  interest  Durbin- 
Constant  rate  production  rate  R2  Watson 
-  1.65  -1.58  2.25  . . .  0.53  2.07 
(-4.56)  (4.55) 
-  1.67  -1.55  2.27  -0.24  0.56  2.03 
(-4.64)  (4.74)  (-2.21) 
a.  The  dependent  variable  is  real  nonoil  commodity  price.  It  is  measuLred  as  the  Economist  dollar  index  of 
commodities  deflated by the  U.S.  GNP  deflator.  Industrial production  is measured by the  IMF index of industrial 
production  in industrial countries.  The  real interest  rate is  measured  as  the  U.S.  medium-term bond yield  less  an 
inflation forecast  derived  from a first order autoregressive  inflation model.  The  real exchange  rate and industrial 
activity  were entered as distributed lags.  Numbers in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
commodities  in  terms  of domestic  and  foreign  deflators.  The  figure  shows 
the real price of materials  in terms of the U.S. and German  deflator. 
Since 1980  the real commodity  price has declined  for the United States 
by more  than  40 percent  and increased  for Germany  by 14  percent. The 
discrepancy-a decline  of the U.S. real  commodity  price  and  an  increase 
abroad-is  an interesting issue for which equation 7 already has an 
answer. Empirical  results  are offered  in table  9. 
The model was tested with quarterly  data for the period 1970:2- 
1985:1.  The real price of commodities  in terms of the U.S. deflator  was 
regressed on a distributed  lag of the real dollar exchange rate and on 
world industrial  production. The regression is run on the logs of the 
variables  in first  differences. 
In the first  equation  in table  9, both industrial  production  and the real 
exchange  rate appear  as significant  determinants  of changes in the real 
commodity  price. A percentage  point growth in the OECD countries' 
level of industrial  production raises real commodity prices by 2.25 
percent. A percentage  point real dollar  appreciation  reduces real com- 
modity  prices  by 1.5  percentage  points.  The  real  exchange  rate  coefficient 
has the anticipated sign, but the effect is far larger than the model 
predicts. The prediction is that the coefficient should be a negative 
fraction, perhaps -  0.5 and certainly not -  1.5. 
A possible explanation  is that the measure  of the real exchange rate 
that is used in the estimates is very heavily weighted  toward  Japan  and 
Canada,  since it is trade-weighted  and  thus shows much  less movement 
than the true variable  corresponding  to the two-region  aggregation  of 
equation  5 above. But it turns out that using a real exchange rate built 334  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
with GDP weights rather than trade weights generates very similar 
results. 
One  alternative  argument  recognizes  the possibility  that  on the supply 
side commodity  extraction  and storage costs are governed by the real 
interest rate. In this case, a rise in the real interest rate will lead to a 
reduction  in the equilibrium  real  price. That  effect is added  in the second 
equation  in table 9. The real interest rate is generated  as the medium- 
term  U.S. bond  yield less a two-year-ahead  forecast of the inflation  rate 
of industrial  countries'  export  prices generated  from  a rolling  first  order 
autoregression  model. A rise in the real  interest  rate  does indeed  lead to 
a reduction  in the real  commodity  price. But the introduction  of the real 
interest rate does not modify the coefficient of the real exchange rate 
and  hence leaves the puzzle. 
A more  promising  alternative  is to consider  the supply  side. It can be 
shown that  under  certain  conditions  the supply  side can, indeed, lead to 
the more than proportionate  effect we find. What is required is the 
following:  that supply  be responsive  to the real price of commodities  in 
LDCs and that the real currency  exchange  rate of the LDCs relative  to 
the dollar move proportionately  more than that of the industrialized 
countries. Thus if the dollar appreciates  relative to the currencies of 
industrialized  countries,  it appreciates  even more  relative  to those of the 
LDCs. Under  these conditions  it is possible to obtain  an elasticity  of the 
real  price  with  respect  to the real  dollar  exchange  rate  that  exceeds unity 
in absolute  value.  14 In terms  of figure  6, the argument  implies  a positively 
sloped supply  schedule  that shifts downward  with a dollar  appreciation 
by enough  to offset the downward  shift  of the world  demand  schedule. 
To summarize, the welfare analysis so far shows that growth in 
industrialized  countries  exerts a strong  effect on LDC terms  of trade.  In 
addition,  because  the prices  of commodities  in terms  of the U.S. deflator 
overreact  to\  the U.S. real exchange rate, the real commodity  price in 
terms of industrial  countries'  exports tends to fall with a strengthening 
of the dollar.  The implication  is that LDCs have an interest  not only in 
14. Let S = S(P,le'P'), where  P' is the GNP  deflator  in producing  countries  and  e' the 
dollar price of their currencies.  We can write P^le'P' =  (P,/P)(P/e'P').  Let d In (P*le'P') 
=  (1 +  K) d In (PleP*). With  e denoting  the supply  elasticity, the elasticity of the real 
commodity  price  is: a ln (P^IP)/d  ln (P/eP*)  =  -  [03*q* +  E(l  +  K)]/(E  +  /eq +  -  *q*).  The 
elasticity  is larger  than  unity  in absolute  value if KE >  frq.  There  is no a priori  reason  for 
excluding  this possibility. Rudiger  Dornbusch  335 
growth  in industrialized  countries,  but also in the distribution  of growth 
between areas and in the policy mix, both of which affect the value of 
the dollar and hence the terms of trade. Other things being equal, a 
strengthening  of the dollar will worsen the terms of trade of net com- 
modity exporters  and hence reduce their welfare. For net commodity 
importers,  the reverse  pattern  holds. 
EXPORT  VOLUME 
The welfare  analysis  assigns a role to LDC export  growth  only in the 
context of well-specified distortions that either make resources not 
fungible  or associate excess benefits  with the production  of exportables 
such  as scale economies  or monopoly  profits.  This  potential  welfare  role 
warrants  a look at the determinants  of export  volume. There  is certainly 
a link between LDC export volume and economic activity in industrial 
countries, but precise estimates are impossible, because the available 
data  do not give a robust  answer  as to the elasticity of the link. 
A look at the data on OECD  growth  and LDC export  growth  shown 
in table 10  makes  the complexity  of the link clear. The table shows that 
growth  in the industrialized  countries  slowed during  the 1970s,  a period 
during  which  export  volumes  from  LDCs actually  accelerated.  The table 
also shows that while export  growth  from  Asia during  the 1960s  ran  far 
ahead of that from Latin America, the gap widened still further  during 
the 1970s.  Thus, it appears  that factors other than industrial  countries' 
growth  are important  determinants  of LDC export  growth. 
Looking  at OECD  imports  from  another  direction,  the Bergsten-Cline 
regression  (frequently  used  for  back-of-the-envelope  LDC  export  growth 
predictions)  explains  the import  volume  growth  of the OECD  countries, 
including  intra-OECD  trade,  by the growth  rate  of their  own GDP.  15  The 
related  regression  shown in equation  9 uses annual  data for the period 
1960-83  (numbers  in parentheses  are t- statistics). 
(9)  OECD import growth  =  -3.21  +  2.55 OECD growth 
(-2.52)  (8.39) 
R2  =  0.75; Durbin-Watson  =  2.19. 
15.  See  William R.  Cline,  International  Debt:  Systemic  Risk and Policy  Response 
(MIT  Press, 1984),  p. 241;  and  Cline,  ed., Trade  Policy in the 1980s  (MIT  Press, 1983),  p. 
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Table 10.  Average Annual Growth Rates, Selected Periods, 1960-83 
Percent 
Industrial country growth  Nonoil  LDC export volume growth 
All 
Industrial  Import  nonoil  Western 
Period  GDP  production  volume  LDCs  Asia  hemisphere 
1960-83  3.7  4.3  6.4  6.1  8.6a  5.5 
1970-83  2.8  2.6  4.2  7.4  10.4  6.1 
Source:  IMF, Internzational  Fitnancial Statistics. 
a.  1964-83 
The elasticity estimate is slightly lower than the original  Bergsten- 
Cline  3:  1  link,  but  the  regression  clearly  confirms  theirfinding.  Of  course, 
the data  refer  to total import  growth  from all sources, of which imports 
from nonoil LDCs is only one. The distinction  is important,  since the 
exports of nonoil LDCs account for only 17 percent of total industrial 
countries' imports.  The next step is to move from total OECD import 
volume  to the export  volume  of LDCs. 
Table 11 shows a regression  for export volume growth  of all nonoil 
LDCs, estimated  with annual  data  for the 1960-83  period.  The first  two 
equations refer to the growth rate of export volume for all nonoil 
developing  countries,  while the last two pertain  to major  LDC exporters 
of manufactures.  The explanatory variables are the growth rate of 
industrial  countries (OECD  growth)  and the percentage  change in the 
relative  price or competitiveness  of this group's  exports (COMP).  The 
relative  price is measured  as the LDC export unit value deflated  by the 
export unit value of industrial  countries. The 1970s  dummy  assumes a 
value of zero in 1961-71 and a value of unity in the remainder  of the 
sample. It stands  for increased  LDC trade  orientation,  regional  diversi- 
fication,  and  OPEC's  emergence  as a major  market. 
The table shows that the elasticity estimate of LDC export growth 
with respect to OECD  growth  cannot be pinned  down. Once the 1970s 
dummy  is entered,  the cyclical elasticity increases strongly.  Moreover, 
when lagged  OECD  growth  is included  (results  not shown in the table), 
the coefficient of that variable  is always negative, though not always 
significant. 
The instability  of the estimates in response to even slight  changes of 
the specification  reflects  the fact that  the left-hand  side variable  shows a 
variation  between -  12 and + 30 percent for the export growth of all Rudiger  Dornbusch  337 
Table 11.  The Determinants of Nonoil LDC Export Growth,  1960-83a 
Summary statistic 
OECD  1970s  Durbin- 
Constant  COMP  growth  dummy  R2  Watson 
All nonoil LDCs 
-0.31  -  0.47  1.74  ...  0.39  1.95 
(-2.64)  (2.49) 
-  10.3  -0.50  3.19  9.63  0.63  2.30 
(-3.62)  (4.84)  (3.81) 
LDC major exporters of manufactures 
1.09  -1.24  2.67  . .  .  0.41  1.85 
(-3.22)  (2.36) 
-  13.0  -1.15  4.74  13.41  0.58  1.92 
(-3.50)  (3.00)  (2.96) 
a.  The dependent  variable is export  volume  growth in nonoil  LDCs.  COMP is the percent  change in the relative 
price of industrial countries'  exports.  Relative  price is the LDCs'  export unit value index divided by the same index 
for the industrial countries.  The dummy variable is zero  in  1961-71  and one  in the rest of the sample.  Numbers  in 
parentheses  are t-statistics. 
nonoil  LDCs  and -  11  to + 53  percent  for  major  manufactures  exporters, 
variations  which are importantly  influenced  by one event, the 1974-76 
business cycle. With  a larger  set of data  it would  be important  to try and 
separate  out short-term  inventory-related  responses and responses to 
changes  in medium-term  growth  rates. At this stage  there  is certainly  no 
firm  finding,  here  or in the literature,  regarding  the elasticity. In addition 
there  are domestic variables  not captured  in the constant. Recession in 
LDCs, especially, would tend to promote  growth  of exports.  16 
The  uncertainty  about  the size of the income  elasticity  is troublesome, 
because  OECD  growth  is invariably  the  central  feature  of any  assessment 
16. Further  evidence is reviewed by Goldstein  and Khan, who distinguish  between 
manufactures  and other commodities  and by subgroup  of exporting  countries. Their 
estimates  of the elasticity  in the 1973-80  period  are  in some cases as high  as 2.3. The high 
elasticities for manufacturing  exporters are also identified  in a study by Bond, who 
disaggregates  trade  flows by import  market  using  annual  data  for the period 1967-81.  In 
that study the cyclical elasticity of manufacturing  exporters with respect to GDP in 
industrial  countries  and OPEC  are, respectively,  2.91 and 1.88. Here, too, the question 
arises  whether  GDP  growth  in part  serves as a proxy  for structural  change  on the demand 
or supply side. See Morris  Goldstein  and Mohsin S. Khan, "Effects of Slowdown in 
Industrial  Countries  on Growth  in Non-Oil  Developing  Countries,"  Occasional  Paper  12 
(IMF, August 1982);  and Marian  E. Bond, "Export  Demand  and Supply  for Groups  of 
Non-oil Developing  Countries,"  IMF Staff Papers, vol. 32 (March 1985), pp. 56-77. 
Equations  estimated  using  data  from  the IFS tapes show very poor results, but come up 
consistently  with  elasticities  close to unity  or even less. 338  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
of the future  of the debt crisis. The results  in table 11  can be interpreted 
as suggesting  that elasticities are high and perhaps  very high. But the 
instability  of the estimates is so large  that these high estimates are to a 
large  extent an artifact  of the 1974-76  period. LDCs might  be important 
marginal suppliers, with significant short-run income elasticities of 
demand  for their goods, enhanced  by inventory  accumulation  effects, 
but with a much  smaller  medium-term  response. 
The regressions  show a sizable effect of competitiveness on export 
volume. Moreover,  that  effect is stable  across alternative  specifications 
of the equations. As is to be expected, the elasticity is larger  for major 
exporters  of manufactures.  The significant  response of export volume 
to competitiveness  of course  points  to adjustment  programs  that  involve 
real  depreciation  as an important  element. 
Purchasing  Power  of Exports.  The purchasing power of exports  is 
defined  as export  revenue  deflated  by import  prices. The determinant  of 
the purchasing  power of exports should be OECD growth that affects 
volume  as well as the terms  of trade.  An estimated  equation  using  annual 
data  for the purchasing  power of exports of all nonoil LDCs is reported 
in table 12. The explanatory  variables are OECD growth, changes in 
competitiveness one year lagged, and the 1970s  dummy already used 
above. 
The interesting  point about these regressions  is the combined  terms- 
of-trade  and  volume  effect. The elasticity  estimate  of 2.5-3 suggests  that 
the high  volume  elasticities  in the regressions  might  overstate  the OECD 
impact. William Cline and Carlos Diaz-Alejandro  have found as an 
additional  explanatory  variable  a role for the lagged  change  in growth.  17 
That  effect does come out in the data, but it is difficult  to understand  it 
in economic terms.  It might  well be associated  with the 1974-76  period. 
EXTERNAL  DEBT  AND  INTEREST  RATES 
A large part  of LDC debt is bank debt, denominated  in dollars  with 
floating-rate  debt service, geared  primarily  to LIBOR  but also in some 
cases to the U.S. prime  rate. Developments  in short-term  interest  rates 
in the United States are therefore of immediate  relevance for debtor 
countries. Although the distinction between gross and net debt is 
17. See Cline, International  Debt; and Carlos  F. Diaz-Alejandro,  "Latin American 
Debt:  I Don't  Think  We  Are in Kansas  Anymore,"  BPEA,  2:1984,  pp. 335-89. Rudiger Dornbusch  339 
Table 12.  Purchasing Power of Exports of Nonoil LDCs,  1961-83a 
Summary  statistic 
Lagged  OECD  1970s  Durbin- 
Constant  COMP  growth  dummy  Rho  R2  Watson 
-4.18  ...  2.63  ...  0.29  0.48  1.96 
(4.45) 
-  8.56  ...  3.04  5.77  ...  0.63  1.94 
(6.10)  (2.96) 
-  5.94  -0.44  2.44  4.97  ...  0.73  2.11 
(-2.87)  (5.14)  (2.95) 
a.  The  dependent  variable is growth  in purchasing power  of exports  in nonoil  LDCs,  defined as export  revenue 
deflated by import prices.  See note to table 11 for definition of the variables.  Numbers in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
neglected  here, it is worth noting, because LDCs have, in some cases, 
large  external  assets. In  fact, some major  borrowers  incurred  their  debts 
in the very act of financing  capital  flight  by domestic residents. Hence, 
at least in accounting  terms, the external  debt is matched  by holdings  of 
external  assets. However, these private  assets are  beyond  the control  of 
the authorities,  making  the gross external  debt the relevant  measure.  18 
There are no solid data on the currency composition of debts. The 
OECD estimates that the share of dollar debt in total debt is about 50 
percent  in the case of long-term  liabilities  and  about  70 percent  for short- 
term debts.19  This high dollar  concentration  plays an important  role in 
the context of a policy mix that involves high U.S. interest rates and 
dollar  appreciation. 
Spreads. The debt service of LDCs is linked to interest rates in the 
world  capital  market  via LIBOR.  The basic interest  rate  charged  on debt 
is LIBOR plus a "country" spread. In 1983 average spreads on new 
credits were 180 basis points. In recent reschedulings  these spreads 
declined  to 100  basis points. But the interest  rate also includes  a second 
spread,  that between LIBOR  and the "risk-free"  interest  rate, say the 
U.S. T-bill  rate.  That  average  spread  in the 1974-84  period  was 187  basis 
18. See Rudiger  Dornbusch,  "Budget  Deficits, Disequilibrium  Exchange  Rates and 
External  Debt," in Gordon  W. Smith  and John  T. Cuddington,  eds., International  Debt 
and the Developing  Countries (World Bank,  1984), pp.  213-35,  and The World Bank, 
World  Development  Report, 1985. 
19. See Organization  for Economic  Cooperation  and Development,  External  Debt of 
Developing  Countries,  1983 Survey (OECD,  1984), and The World Bank,  World Devel- 
opment Report, 1985. 340  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1985 
points, but  it fell as low as 75 basis points  in 1984.  This "banking"  spread 
reflects costs of bank intermediation  and the risk premium  banks have 
to pay in funding  their  own lending. 
Equation 10 explains the banking  spread  in terms of the level of the 
T-bill  rate, the log of the real price of oil, and a dummy  for the Herstatt 
episode in 1974,  when funds to the Eurodollar  market  dried  up because 
of uncertainty  about legal commitments  of parent  banks. The Herstatt 
dummy  assumes  a value  of unity  for 1974:2  to 1974:4  and  zero elsewhere. 
The  real  oil  price  appears  as a proxy  for  the  effect  of increased  placements 
by oil producers  in the Eurodollar  market. 
Spread  =  2.68  +  0.25  T-bill -0.71  Oil price 
(10)  (4.65)  (6.14)  (-4.03) 
+  1.86 Herstatt dummy 
(4.92) 
R  = 0.67; Durbin-Watson  =  2.0. 
The  regression  explains  a significant  part  of the variation  in the spread, 
and each of the explanatory  variables  is highly significant.  Most inter- 
esting is the level of the T-bill  rate. A 4 percentage  point  rise in the level 
of the T-bill  rate  raises the spread  by a full percentage  point. 
The  Real Interest  Rate.  For welfare  questions, the real  interest  rate, 
not the nominal  rate,  is significant.  Figure  8 shows the real  rate  of interest 
on LDC debts, measured  as the six-month  lagged LIBOR  adjusted  by 
the three-month  forward  rate of inflation  of export  unit values of nonoil 
LDCs. The outstanding  periods  are 1972-73  and 1976,  with  negative  real 
rates of up to 33 percent, and 1980-82, with positive real rates reaching 
47 percent. 
Measuring  the real interest rate poses two separate  issues. The first 
is whether it is meaningful  to look at short-term  real interest rates in 
assessing debt burdens.  To the extent that  real  rates  are  high  because of 
a transitory  decline in prices that is subsequently  reversed, long-term 
real  rates  would  average  to much  smaller  numbers,  and  a period  such as 
1973 or 1981 might exaggerate events. But there is really no serious 
reason  why capital  gains or losses-the  revaluation  of the real value of 
debts-should  not be carried  along and treated  as a component  of real 
interest. The procedure  is technically correct and eliminates  guessing 
about  normal  prices. Rudiger Dornbusch  341 
Figure 8.  The Real Interest Rate of Nonoil LDCs, 1971:1-1984:3a 
Percent 
Source:  IMF, Itnternational Financial  Statistics. 
a.  The real rate is measured as the six-month lagged LIBOR adjusted with the three-month forward rate of inflation 
of export unit values  of nonoil LDCs. 
The second issue concerns the appropriate  deflator-export prices, 
import  prices, some mix of the two, U. S. prices, or debtor  GDP  deflators 
or consumer  price indexes. Theory here leaves no question:  consumer 
and  producer  decisions are geared  to the consumption  rate  of interest  in 
terms of the CPI and to the rate of interest on investment.20  Welfare 
questions can be consistently answered  with the expression developed 
in the appendix.  The choice of numeraire  for measuring  welfare  effects 
in no way implies  that  changes  in other  prices  do not have welfare  effects 
if they change  implicit  real interest  rates.21 
20. See RudigerDornbusch,  "Real  Interest  Rates,  Home  Goods,  and  Optimal  External 
Borrowing," Journal of Political Economy,  vol. 91 (February 1983), pp. 141-53. 
21. Specifically,  let all  future  import  prices  rise  by  a percent,  with  no changes  in  export 
prices.  In equation  16  of the appendix  we then have:  AW  =  -  M5+  I  p'+  I r. But  from  the 342  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
The Implications  of Alternative OECD Policy Mixes 
Debtor  nonoil  LDC  s, as the  preceding  analysis  shows, have  a common 
interest  in some combination  of strong  OECD  growth,  low real interest 
rates, and  a weak dollar-a  reenactment  of 1972-74.  The precise effects 
of OECD growth, interest rates, and the dollar, however, differ from 
country to  country, depending on the trade and debt structure of 
individual  LDCs. 
A combination  of, say, 1.5  extra  points  of OECD  growth,  2  percentage 
points higher  LIBOR  rates, and a 10 percent dollar  appreciation  could 
mean  a net financial  benefit  to one LDC, a net loss to another.  The higher 
an  LDC's bank  debt  is relative  to exports,  and  the larger  its concentration 
in commodity  exports, the less likely that country  is to gain. But if the 
same OECD growth came because of reduced interest rates and were 
accompanied  by a decline  in  the dollar,  commodity  exporters  and  debtors 
alike would gain. Under certain circumstances, even lower  OECD 
growth  can help. A recession in the industrialized  nations that led to a 
cyclical decline in interest  rates might  benefit  a large  debtor  because the 
lower interest  rates could more  than  offset the disadvantage  of reduced 
growth. 
There are two possible approaches to the discussion of linkages 
between  OECD  macroeconomics  and  LDC  performance.  One  evaluates 
disturbances  from  the LDC welfare  perspective. The other, a cash-flow 
approach,  focuses on the sustainability  of debts. It has no normative 
implications  but  rather  asks whether  LDC  debts  over time  become  better 
or poorer  assets. It views a declining  debt-export  ratio  as an improving 
course of events. The evaluation  of linkages in the preceding section 
clearly indicates important  linkages between events at the center and 
LDC  debt  problems  via terms  of trade,  export  volume,  and  interest  rates. 
The cash-flow debt model organizes these factors to analyze debt 
dynamics. 
budget  constraint  in equation 14a  we can substitute  to obtain:  AW =  r (K  -  R*X'+1), 
where K denotes initial  debt plus first  period  borrowing.  Hence a rise in import  prices  at 
constant  nominal  interest  rates  raises  welfare  in proportion  to initial  debt  plus  borrowing. 
In addition,  there  is, of course, the adverse  terms-of-trade  effect, -R*X+l  r, which has 
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THE  CASH-FLOW  MODEL  OF  DEBT  DYNAMICS 
Official  policy in the industrialized  countries, and perhaps  mostly in 
the United States, is to restore  the quality  of LDC debts. The necessity 
of keeping  debts "productive"  is seen as an essential organizing  princi- 
ple of international  relations and adjustment  programs  in LDCs. The 
belief is that the sheer passage of time, together with necessary and 
desirable  adjustments  in LDCs, will produce  a path  of current  accounts, 
debt accumulation,  and  export  revenues  that  implies  a declining  ratio  of 
debt to exports. 
Cline pioneered  this approach  and created a framework  of analysis 
that  was to the debt  problem  what  penicillin  is to public  health.  The view 
was that  within  a few years, given dollar  depreciation,  moderate  interest 
rates, and sustained OECD growth, debt-export  ratios even of major 
debtors  would fall back to the levels of the early 1970s.  Moreover,  that 
correction  could be achieved under  conditions  of growth  in the debtor 
countries  .22 
The analysis lends plausibility  to the idea that international  banking 
has finally  come to grips with the perennial  problem  of LCD defaults. 
The essential  step was to recognize  that  liquidity  problems,  not the long- 
run fundamentals,  are what gives rise to default. Hence, the IMF was 
taken  down from  the shelves, dusted  off, and given a new life (far  away 
from multilateral  surveillance  applied  to U.S. fiscal policy) as liquidity 
and  adjustment  manager. 
The model  of debt  dynamics  recognizes  that  the evolution  of the debt- 
export  ratio  is governed  by two determinants:  the nominal  interest  rate 
on debt relative  to the growth  rate of export revenue, i* - X, with A  the 
growth rate of export revenue, and the noninterest current account 
surplus  as a fraction  of exports, x. With  the debt-export  ratio denoted 
by d, the basic equation  for the rate of change of the debt-export  ratio 
is: 
(d  =*  -A)  -  (11) 
~~~~d  d 
22. See Cline,  InternationalDebt,  and  "International  Debt:  From  Crisis  to Recovery?" 
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Figure 9.  Debt Dynamics 
Debt-export  ratio 
Ratio  of  noninterest  surplus in current account  to exports 
The  equation  states  that  the debt-export  ratio  falls  if the  rate  of interest 
falls short  of the growth  rate  of export  revenue, i* - A  < 0. Note that  the 
relevant interest rate here is the effective rate, which is the weighted 
average  across all kinds of debt, ranging  across creditors  and currency 
denominations.  Even if that  condition  fails to hold, the debt-export  ratio 
can still  be declining  provided  the debtor  country  runs  a sufficiently  large 
noninterest  current  account  surplus,  which  will be used to pay a fraction, 
(,  of debt service: 
(12)  x =  oi*d. 
Any part of the interest bill that is not paid by the noninterest  current 
account surplus  is automatically  financed  by new borrowing.  Figure 9 
shows the case where  the interest  rate  exceeds the growth  rate  of export 
earnings. The debt process is  still stable, converging to zero debt, Rudiger  Dornbusch  345 
Table 13.  The Determinants of Debt Accumulation, 1970-85 
Annual  average,  in percent 
Indicator and country  1970-79  1980-84  1984:1-1985:1 
LIBOR  10.3  12.9  10.4 
Growth of export earnings 
All nonoil LDCs  20.2  2.5  - 8.9 
Brazil  21.0  7.6  -7.7 
Korea  37.9  13.6  - 8.2 
Noninterest  current account  surplusa 
All nonoil  LDCs  n.a.  2.7  6.7b 
Latin America  n.a.  7.7  27.lb 
Sources:  IMF, Internzational  Financial  Statistics,  and World Econlomnic  Olutlook, 1985. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  Percentage of exports  of goods  and services. 
b.  1984-85. 
provided  A  > i*(1  - ot).  Of course, if export  revenue  falls, more  than  the 
whole interest bill must be paid in order to avoid growth in the debt- 
export  ratio. 
Table 13  shows data  for LIBOR,  the growth  rates of export  earnings, 
and  noninterest  current  accounts. In the period 1970-79  the growth  rate 
of exports substantially  exceeded interest  rates, leaving  ample  room  for 
noninterest  deficits.  The LDCs could  receive resource  transfers  without 
a deterioration  in their external creditworthiness  as measured  by the 
debt-export  ratio. In fact, any country that ran a deficit, even one as 
large as its interest payments, would have experienced a dramatic 
reduction  in its debt-export  ratio. 
As the table shows, during  the period 1980-84 the climate became 
problematic  for debtors with low export growth. Unless they made 
adjustments,  as did Korea, their debt-export  ratio in fact would deteri- 
orate massively. For Latin America, the period was catastrophic. 
Whatever  useful purpose external borrowing  had served in the early 
1970s, in 1979-82 it primarily  financed capital flight and poor public 
finance.  Of course, if the 1984-85  experience of falling  export revenue 
continues for any length of time, it opens a totally new game: with 
declining  revenues  thejoy of debt service falters  even for the eager.  The 
question is whether OECD macroeconomic  developments can be ex- 
pected now to make a decisive contribution  to the solution of the debt 
problem  or whether,  just as in 1983-85, most of the work must be done 
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SCENARIOS 
From  the point  of view of industrialized  countries,  the common  policy 
objectives are to sustain growth under conditions of low inflation  and 
continuing  correction  of budget  deficits. Objectives  differ  with respect 
to the dollar.  The United States would prefer,  inflation  aside, a weaker 
dollar  so as to achieve stronger  recovery  in manufacturing  and  improved 
conditions  in  agriculture.  For  Europe,  troubled  by record  unemployment 
and a real wage already  thought  too high, a depreciating  dollar  would 
present a difficult  problem. In a longer term perspective, the central 
problem  of industrialized  countries  and  the world  economy  is, however, 
the  level of real  interest  rates.  Unless real  rates  decline,  budget  correction 
seems unlikely  or at least extremely  costly. In the meantime,  high real 
rates impair  capacity  expansion  and  hence the longer  term  performance 
of the industrialized  countries with respect to growth, price stability, 
and stability  of finance. 
A case has been made  for a monetary-fiscal  policy mix that involves 
a transitory  European  fiscal expansion, a long-term  fiscal tightening  in 
the United States, and an accommodating  monetary policy.23  That 
continues  to be the "first-best"  recommendation.  It is first-best  in that 
it would ensure a continuing  recovery together  with a declining  dollar. 
The accommodating  monetary  policy would  even solve the real interest 
rate problem, or at least not worsen it, although  at the risk of some 
increase  in  inflation.  The  package  would  not solve the LDC  debt  problem 
by the stroke of a pen, but it would help via dollar depreciation  and 
continuing  growth. For the moment, however, there appears  to be no 
inclination  in Europe  to turn  toward  coordinated  fiscal  expansion, even 
of a transitory  nature.  World  attention  has focused on the U.S. budget 
deficits, and it is firmly  believed that cutting the deficits will remedy 
many if not all of the problems of the world economy. This is very 
doubtful. 
23. See Olivier Blanchard  and Rudiger  Dornbusch,  "U.S. Deficits, the Dollar and 
Europe," Banca Nazionale  del Lavoro, Quarterly Review,  no.  148 (March 1984), pp. 89- 
113;  R. Layard  and others, "The Case for Unsustainable  Growth," CEPS Discussion 
Papers  (Brussels:  Center  for European  Policy, April 1984);  Blanchard  and others, "Em- 
ployment  and Growth:  A Two-Handed  Approach,"  CEPS Discussion  Papers  (Brussels: 
CenterforEuropean  Policy  Studies,  May  1985);  and  RudigerDornbusch,  "Sound  Currency 
and  Full  Employment"(London:  The Employment  Institute,  May 1985). Rudiger Dornbusch  347 
The position of the United States, and hence the LDCs, is uncom- 
fortable.  The U.S. monetary-fiscal  mix can be changed  only at the cost 
of provoking  some renewed inflation  or recession. A shift toward  tight 
fiscal policy and lower real interest rates can, of course, be brought 
about  by raising  taxes and expanding  the real money stock. Moreover, 
the change can be made in a manner  that sustains the level and rate of 
expansion of total OECD demand. What cannot easily be done is to 
avoid the dollar  depreciation  that would almost inevitably  accompany 
such a change of the mix. And if the dollar  depreciation  were to occur 
on a significant  scale, it could  easily become  the source  of an  acceleration 
of inflation. 
There  is an obvious difficulty  in reconciling  the interests  of LDCs and 
the industrial  countries.  The United States had  through  1983-84  the best 
of all  worlds:  strong  recovery  and  growth  without  significant  acceleration 
of inflation.  The growth  could take place, because of fiscal expansion, 
despite high interest rates. But the high interest rates served as a 
protection  against  a collapse of the exchange  rate  and  hence inflationary 
pressure  from importables.  It might  seem unreasonable  to suggest that 
the dollar  be kept overvalued, until  further  notice, simply  to delay the 
day of reckoning  with respect to U.S. inflation.  It might seem equally 
unreasonable  to enact wage controls merely to avoid an extra 2 or 3 
percent  inflation  stemming  from  the impact  of an exchange  rate  collapse 
on wages. It might,  however, be entirely  reasonable  to pursue  first-best 
policies in the industrial  countries in the belief that in the longer run 
LDCs  can  benefit  only  from  the macroeconomic  stability  of the advanced 
countries. To do this, one would correct U.S. fiscal policies over the 
next few years in a credible  fashion, pursue at least a transitory  fiscal 
expansion  in Europe, and make sure that the dollar  comes down gently 
and in an undisruptive  manner.  This is the soft-landing  option  that may 
have been in the making  during  the past  few months. 
The immediate  concerns  of the LDCs are  liquidating  debt and  raising 
real commodity  prices. In the short run, the OECD policy that would 
give the greatest  relief  would  be one featuring  the most  reckless  spending 
and money printing imaginable. Policy options that emphasize soft 
landing  are at best in the LDCs' interest  only when one looks far ahead 
and  argues  that  this is the only avenue  for securing  sustained  growth. 
While  OECD  policies are not governed  by the interests  of LDCs, the 
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oration in the cash-flow debt dynamics. There is no expectation of a 
continuing  decline  in  export  revenues  or  of increasing  interest  rate  levels. 
Some dollar depreciation  and moderate  growth and inflation  allow an 
outlook of 10-15 percent growth in export earnings, a rate, for most 
countries,  greater  than  the effective interest  rate. But  that  outlook  makes 
it clear that neither dollar collapse nor high, sustained  growth can be 
expected. Nor, on  the  other  hand,  should  one expect  protracted  recession 
or sharp  increases  in interest  rates. 
In sum  the scenario  for OECD  countries  provides  a neutral  setting  for 
any LDC that does not, as yet, have debt difficulties.  Problem  debtors 
should  not expect rapid  relief. For Latin  debtors, most of the relief  must 
come from their  domestic adjustment  or a rewriting  of the debt. OECD 
macroeconomics  will in all likelihood  do little to work  down  debt-export 
ratios. That must come from noninterest  surpluses  that the LDCs are 
trying  to accumulate  as part  of the stabilization  programs. 
Adjustment  in the LDCs 
In 1946  the Foreign  Bondholders  Protective  Council  reported  that of 
the outstanding  publicly offered or guaranteed  dollar bonds of Latin 
America, 53 percent  were in default  as to interest and sinking  fund, 45 
percent  were receiving adjusted  debt service, and only 2 percent were 
serviced in full.24 Such a situation  has characterized  much of the past 
150  years.  But  in  one crucial  respect,  the  current  experience  is completely 
new. Today, developing  countries  are not receiving  resource transfers 
to foster capital accumulation  and growth in their standard  of living. 
Instead, they are servicing  their  debts by transferring  resources  toward 
the creditors.  Even more serious, the creditors  are reluctant  to receive 
debt service in the only way it can come, namely  in kind, by LDC trade 
surpluses.  Just  as in  the 1930s  prior  to massive  LDC  default,  the  creditors 
are erecting  trade  obstacles to debt service. 
There  is now a confusion  of priorities:  banks  practice  credit  rationing, 
seeking  a reduction  in the debt-export  ratio  on a dramatically  accelerated 
path  that  is entirely  unwarranted  by any  consideration  of debt stability.25 
24. See Foreign  Bondholders  Protective  Council,  Inc., Report  for Years  1946  to 1949 
(New York, 1950),  pp. 376-77. 
25. See D.  Cohen, "LDC Debt Service and Solvency," paper presented at the 
Economic Policy Conference,  Paris, June 1985;  and Mario  Henrique  Simonsen, "The Rudiger Dornbusch  349 
The primary  purpose is to reduce the cost of capital for banks and 
enhance  bank  balance  sheets. LDCs may benefit  from  reductions  in the 
cost of capital  to banks, but surely not sufficiently  to warrant  the debt 
retirement  strategy. 
Debt service, as the German experience with reparations  in the 
interwar  period amply  demonstrates,  involves a transfer  problem.  The 
problem  arises in three ways: how to raise the budget  revenue for debt 
service in a noninflationary  way, how to shift resources to the external 
sector so as to cut the budget and accumulate  a trade surplus under 
conditions of high employment, and how to succeed in earning the 
foreign  exchange  with which  to service the debt. At each step things  can 
go badly  wrong. 
Among the particular  circumstances  influencing  a nation's ability  to 
service its external  debt, four deserve special attention.  The first  is the 
burden  of interest  payments  as measured  by the  ratio  of interest  payments 
to GDP. The second is the openness of the economy as measured  by the 
ratio of exports to GDP. The remaining  two are politics and the public 
sector budget. These circumstances  determine  for each nation  both its 
welfare losses from an external disturbance  and its macroeconomic 
performance  upon  being  exposed to a shock. I now discuss each in turn, 
using  the perspective  of the three  aspects of the transfer  problem.  Table 
14  highlights  two of the elements, the interest  burden  and the degree of 
openness. 
THE  BUDGET  PROBLEM 
The source of the budget problem is debt nationalization,  which 
occurs when private  sector debt is dumped  into the budget  in the course 
of the financial collapse of the banking system. This experience is 
peculiar  to Latin  America  and  is not common  in Asia. 
Governments  that already  have difficulties  financing  their fiscal ex- 
penditures are suddenly forced to marshal resources worth several 
percent  of GDP.  A tax increase  is out  of the question,  because  the  burden 
would fall primarily  on wage earners, not on capital, which effectively 
avoids taxation.  Inflation,  therefore,  is the inevitable  outcome, at least 
as long as the government  finds no way to cut spending.  But financing 
Developing-Country  Debt Problem,"  in Smith  and Cuddington,  eds., International  Debt 
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Table 14.  Structural Characteristics of LDCs,  1984 
Percent of GDP 
Latin 
Item  Asia  Africa  America  Korea  Brazil 
Interest payments  1.7  2.8  4.7  5.1  5.5 
Exports  27.7  24.6  16.4  37.3  10.3 
Source:  IMF, Internzational  Finianicial  Statistics,  and World Econiomic Olutlook, 1985, and Morgan Guaranty. 
debt service as large as a few percentage  points of GDP with inflation 
means  a dramatic  increase  in inflation. 
The public, recognizing that the increased charge on the budget 
represents inflation and possibly asset taxation, turns to the foreign 
exchange market. Speculation  against  the currency, if there is capital 
mobility, will immediately lead to pressure on reserves and hence 
inevitably to a sharp depreciation  of the currency, further  increasing 
inflation.  The problem  is aggravated  when an already  precarious  budget 
situation is worsened by reduced foreign exchange revenues as, for 
example, is the case in Mexico. 
If exchange rate collapse is to be avoided, asset holders have to be 
compensated  by sufficiently  high rates of interest. In Brazil, Mexico, 
and Argentina,  real interest  rates range  between 50 and 100  percent. Of 
course, the high real rates of interest ultimately  breed their own insta- 
bility, since debts are being rolled over at these rates and thus must 
eventually  get entirely out of line with the tax base or the return  from 
real  capital.  What  looks like a holding  action, therefore,  is in the end yet 
another  debt crisis, this one domestic, to be resolved either  by repudia- 
tion or by inflation. 
The first problem,  then, is the inflation  cost, or real interest  cost, of 
securing  the budget  revenue  for debt service. 
THE  FOREIGN  EXCHANGE  PROBLEM 
The second problem  is to translate  the increased  budget  revenue  into 
earnings of foreign exchange. When inflation is used to finance the 
government,  the process is direct:  the government  issues money to buy 
foreign  exchange, forcing  the rate  to whatever  level is necessary  to buy 
the needed  amounts.  Private  speculation  goes in the same  direction,  and 
hence real depreciation  and high or even accelerating  inflation  are the Rudiger Dornbusch  351 
rule. If taxation or expenditure  cuts are used, the adjustment  is more 
complicated. To maintain  full employment, relative prices now must 
change. In terms of the model set forth at the outset of this paper, the 
real  price  of home goods must  decline, releasing  resources  to the traded 
goods sector even as the public  sector is cutting  spending. 
Real depreciation  means, in practice, that the real wage must fall in 
terms  of tradables.  The only way a country  can gain  access to additional 
foreign  exchange  is to reduce  its dollar  costs. The extent of the required 
reduction  depends  on two factors. The first  is the domestic response of 
employment in the traded goods sector to the real wage. The more 
responsive employment  is, the smaller  the real wage cut. The other is 
the elasticity  of demand  for the country's  output.  The size of the foreign 
trade  sector  certainly  is a consideration  here. The larger  the trade  sector, 
the easier it becomes, other things being equal, to generate foreign 
exchange  worth  an extra  percent  of GDP. 
With perfectly elastic demand, the problem is entirely classical. If 
demand  is less than  perfectly  elastic, however, it becomes necessary to 
put the country's resources on sale, raising the possibility that quite 
substantial  real wage cuts and cuts in the standard  of living will be 
required  to achieve a given trade  surplus. 
The importance  of the size of the foreign  trade sector is evident in a 
comparison  of Brazil  and  Korea.  Generating  a given  increase  in  the trade 
surplus  is much  easier  for Korea, because its export sector accounts  for 
a relatively  large  share  of GNP. Other  things  being equal, Brazil  would 
need a depreciation  three to five times as large  as that of Korea  to have 
the same payoff in terms of net foreign exchange revenues. That, of 
course, has an immediate  impact on inflation  as well as on political 
considerations,  such as the redistribution  of income between different 
sectors. 
In Korea  income  distribution  is remarkably  equal, social services are 
advanced.  Real depreciation  is largely  uncontroversial,  because it does 
not significantly  redistribute  income  between  different  groups.  In Brazil, 
where income distribution  is highly unequal, real depreciation is a 
politically  divisive real wage issue. Furthermore,  in Korea real depre- 
ciation  is practically  a growth  machine,  since it applies  to the large  trade 
sector and  thus a very large  share  of GNP. In Brazil,  by contrast,  where 
the trade sector is small, depreciation  is seen primarily  as a disruptive 
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income  distribution  is so unequal  in Brazil,  indexation  arrangements  are 
essential to avoid political confrontation,  and that in turn means real 
depreciation  is largely  impossible. 
The difference  in structure  explains  why Korea  can use depreciation 
to achieve external balance correction  with little inflation  and a large 
and favorable impact on growth. It also explains why Brazil avoids 
depreciation,  as being  inflationary  and  disruptive,  and  chooses, instead, 
trade  restriction  and  recession. 
SYSTEMWIDE  PROBLEMS 
The transfer  problem  has a third  dimension. Actual debt service, if 
there  are no assets to be liquidated,  can be effected only in kind, that  is, 
by a trade surplus.  But that raises two separate  difficulties.  The first is 
that when many LDCs try, at the same time, to service their debts by 
trade  surpluses,  they are pursuing  jointly a real depreciation  policy that 
worsens their terms of trade. This secondary  burden  of the transfer  is 
unquestionably  part  of the LDC terms-of-trade  deterioration. 
The second  issue, already  raised  above, is market  access. The  creditor 
countries,  concerned  about  increased  imports,  respond  to the increased 
cost  competitiveness (due to devaluation) of the LDCs with trade 
restrictions.  But if debt service is to continue, LDCs will have to gain 
yet more in competitiveness  to overcome the new restrictions.  Gaining 
competitiveness, of course, implies reduced  real wages and a reduced 
standard  of living. 
DEBT  SERVICE  FATIGUE 
Given  the intense  difficulties  involved  in generating  debt service, it is 
reasonable  to ask why LDCs service their debts rather  than declaring 
default. One reason is clearly that the system is so well managed  that 
liquidity  problems  that  would  make  nonpayment  inevitable  do not  occur. 
Why, having  a choice, do the LDCs continue to pay? In the past, they 
acted on the belief that failure to service debts would be extremely 
expensive in foreign  policy terms:  assets would be seized, trade  would 
be disrupted,  and the debtor countries might  effectively become siege 
economies.  At present,  an  even more  fundamental  concern  is that  default 
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domestic  instability. Capital  would try to leave through  any available 
channel.  Inflation  control  would  disappear  and,  with  it, political  stability. 
Moreover,  from questioning  external  debts, it is a short step to asking 
questions about domestic debts and, more generally, income distribu- 
tion. The politics are  much  too precarious  for a government  to open that 
box. The most striking  confirmation  of this turn  of thinking  comes from 
President  Alfonsin of Argentina.  Only a year ago he claimed that his 
country's  foreign  debt could not be serviced with the blood and  tears of 
his  people. In  August  of this  year,  he told  the assembled  national  financial 
community  that  the international  debt would be serviced  with dignity. 
The reduction  of LDC debt-export  ratios that is under  way is said to 
be in the interest  of "the international  system," as if the community  at 
large  had  an interest.  Clearly,  creditor  banks  do, but  that  is where  things 
stop. Industrial  countries  as a group  have little interest  in paying  for the 
premature  interest receipt with increased unemployment  and foreign 
policy  confrontation.  In  the debtor  countries  the accelerated  debt  service 
is altogether  perverse.  It means  not only a cut in per  capita  consumption 
but also a deterioration  of trend  growth  potential,  with saving  financing 
debt service rather  than investment. There is a growing  gap between 
productive  employment,  as opposed  to governmentjobs,  and  the rapidly 
growing  labor  force. 
Few are willing to argue that the present policy of reducing debt- 
export  ratios  is strictly  temporary,  very soon to be reversed  by renewed 
resource  transfers  from  the industrial  countries  to LDCs.  That,  of course, 
raises the question  of whether  an ongoing  policy of forced debt service 
is not outright  counterproductive.  On  a cash-flow  basis  the debt  problem 
is more  or less under  control, but  debt service fatigue  is building  up even 
in developing  countries  where the external  balance is not the principal 
issue. Rightly, these countries blame their poor macroeconomic  per- 
formance  on the difficulty  of servicing  debt at short notice. The banks 
cannot be expected to make the first gesture in adjusting  debt service, 
but surely it is not sensible to make it a matter  of national  interest  that 
LDCs should service debts at a pace congenial to the international 
financial  system, as an open-ended commitment  without targets and 
without apparent  benefit to the debtor LDCs. Carlos Diaz-Alejandro 
reminds  us of what happened  last time: 
Led by able technocrats,  Argentine  economic policy adjusted;  the country 
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foreign  exchange  for  profit  remittances  abroad.  Argentine  growth  and  industrial- 
ization even managed  to pick up, and by the late 1930s  all seemed reasonably 
well. The nationalist-populist  coup of June 1943,  however, was able to revive 
memories  of wounded  national  pride  with  notable  domestic  political  success and 
with disturbing  consequences  for the international  system.26 
APPENDIX 
Welfare Analysis in a Two-Period Setting 
THIS  APPENDIX  spells out the welfare analysis of the undistorted economy 
in  a  simple  two-period  setting.  The  procedure  follows  the  standard 
Meade-Fleming welfare calculus using a utility function, the assumption 
of  maximization  under perfect  competition  by households  and firms, 
and the intertemporal budget constraint. Households  maximize a utility 
function: 
(13)  V = 
U(Cn2, 
Cm*,  Cc,  C,I) + R U(Ct'+,  Ct+*  1, Ct+1, Ct+Q), 
where R is the discount factor determined by the rate of time preference. 
The  budget  constraint  states  that two-period  expenditures  valued  at 
world prices  and world interest rates must equal the present  value of 
income.  Expenditures include investment: 
(14)  pi (Di-Qi)  +  b  +  R*Ep'+?I  (D+1  -oQ+  1)  =  O, 
or, using the definition of imports and exports: 
(14a)  E pxMi -  X  + R* (Ept+ I Mit+  I -  Xt+ 1) +  b =O, 
where  commodity  j  is  chosen  as  numeraire.  The  demand  levels  are 
Di  =  Ci +  Ii and D'+1  =  Cr+ 1. The term b  =  Bo0P1  denotes the real value 
of the initial debt,  measured in terms of commodity j; Mi denotes  the 
level  of  imports  and  X,  the  level  of  exports.  The  term  R*  is  the 
international real discount factor, with the real interest rate measured in 
terms of commodityj: 
(15)  R*  =  P)(+*)  (1+r' 
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Where  rj  is the implicit  real interest  rate. 
The marginal  welfare effect of disturbances  is calculated  as the first 
order  approximation  of equation 13. Differentiating  equation 13 totally 
and using the budget  constraint  as well as the first  order  conditions  that 
show equalization  of relative marginal  utilities or products to relative 
prices, I obtain: 
dV  Kd_R* 
(16)  U- =  AW =-db  -  (E Midpi + R* E M'+ I dp'+ I) +  R 
~'  U. 
I  R* 
where K denotes initial debt plus the first period trade deficit, that is 
K  =  b +  E piM, -  X. The first term measures the welfare benefit of a 
reduction  in the real value of debt through  write-offs. The second term 
represents  the welfare  reduction  that  arises  from  terms-of-trade  changes. 
The terms-of-trade  loss is equal to the income effect of a price change 
and is measured  by the level of imports  times the increase in the real 
price of imports. Of course, for a good of which the country is a net 
exporter,  imports  are  negative  and  hence a real  price  increase  represents 
a welfare gain. The last term  finally  measures  the welfare  cost of a rise 
in the real interest rate. It is equal to first period debt plus borrowing 
times the rise in the real  rate of interest. 
Equation  16  identifies  only three  external  influences  on home  welfare: 
reductions in external debt, terms-of-trade  changes, and real interest 
changes. Foreign activity, in the absence of domestic distortions or 
borrowing  constraints,  has no direct impact  on welfare except through 
any induced  changes in the home country's equilibrium  terms of trade. 
Of course, a foreign shock in demand  will typically affect at the same 
time  commodity  prices  and  interest  rates  so that  there  would  be additional 
effects to be taken  into account. 
In the presence of credit rationing  the derivation  follows that above 
except that now maximization  takes place subject to the additional 
constraint  that  the current  account  deficit  in the first  period  be less than 
or equal  to a given available  credit  line J: 
(17)  EMipi -  X  J. 
If the credit constraint  is effective, the shadow discount  factor R' falls 
short of the world discount factor R*. The extent of credit rationing  is 
indicated by 0 <  R'/R*  =  -y <  1. Credit rationing modifies equation  16 
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( 16a)  A W =  -  Y-Midpi  -  R* (Il -  y) IMi + l dpi  +I} 
+  (1I  -  -)J(dR)  ?  -yd.  (  )(R*) 
The presence of credit rationing  is reflected in the valuation  of future 
terms-of-trade  improvements  and of discount rate shocks. It is most 
apparent  in the extra  term ydJ, which is the welfare  gain  of extra  credit. Comments 
and Discussion 
William  H. Branson: This  paper  by Rudiger  Dornbusch  is, as his  usually 
are,  full  of interesting  and  useful  facts, tables,  regressions,  and  suggestive 
hypotheses, all of which make  it at least good reading.  In his analysis  of 
performance  links, Dornbusch  focuses on three channels  of influence- 
commodity  prices, real interest  rates, and  quantity  effects on exports- 
running  from OECD macroeconomics to the condition of the LDC 
debtors.  He concludes  that  OECD  expansion  or  contraction  has  conflict- 
ing  effects on LDC  debtors  through  these channels  and  that  it is necessary 
to specify the exogenous source of OECD expansion to reach a clear 
conclusion  about  what those effects might  be. I agree. For example, an 
investment-led  expansion in the OECD would raise real interest rates 
and reduce lending to the LDCs, and increase the demand for their 
exports. Since the expansion of international  capital markets in the 
1970s,  we can no longer  rely on simple Keynesian  export multipliers  to 
analyze  transmission  from  the OECD  to the LDCs. 
In general, I agree with the analysis and the somewhat ambiguous 
conclusions of the paper. But several issues require  clarification,  and 
others elicit minor  disagreement  and questions about approach.  I raise 
these issues more  or less in the order  in which they appear  in the paper. 
One focal point of the paper  is how differences  in structure  or policy 
among  LDCs (or groups  of LDCs) account  for their  differing  responses 
to external disturbances.  To sort out these differences among LDCs, 
three hypotheses are offered at the beginning  of the paper. The first, 
Dornbusch's  favorite, is that  countries  differ  in trade  structure  or initial 
indebtedness.  The second is that they differ in domestic policies. The 
third  is that  they have "a differential  ability  to adapt  to external  shocks.  " 
These are  indeed  important  points, but  their  status  as competing  hypoth- 
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eses  is not clear. Cannot the third problem be due to the first, for 
example?  Differential  ability  to adjust  might  be due to structural  differ- 
ences. By now the literature  on policy  response  is well developed  enough 
that we might  consider differences  in domestic policy to be part  of the 
differential  structure  of the economies involved. Thus the paper  begins 
with  an  uncharacteristic  ambiguity  on the separateness  of the hypotheses 
to be considered, contributing  to the somewhat  discursive tone main- 
tained throughout.  One point on language  might  be worth noting here, 
too. The implicit  opposite of "moderation  in budget  deficits and trade- 
oriented  policies" is given as "waste and  inefficiency." We might  want 
to consider  more  reasonable-sounding  alternatives. 
The first substantive  section of the paper  presents a very clear and 
elegant  framework  model  for analyzing  terms-of-trade  effects on debtor 
LDCs of various shocks to the system. The model is later used to 
introduce  the importance  of structural  differences between countries, 
especially  in trade  patterns.  I think  one additional  type of trade  structure 
could have been brought  into the model at this point. Many  developing 
countries,  mainly  in Africa, still export  one or two tree or mineral  crops 
with inelastic export supply. They also import  capital  goods and inter- 
mediate inputs with inelastic import demand. This pattern of trade 
substantially  reduces trade elasticity in these countries and calls into 
question  the effectiveness of devaluation  as a policy for maintaining  or 
restoring  trade  balance.  I emphasized  this point  in a 1983  article  referred 
to by Dornbusch,' and I would be interested to see how this kind of 
structural  difference  would fit into the framework  model. Perhaps  the 
NN curve in figure  1 would steepen and  the MM curve would  flatten. 
The importance  of differences  in openness, emphasized  in the paper 
by Jeffrey  Sachs, also in this issue, is apparent  in Dornbusch's  table 4. 
Latin America  has a much higher  debt-export  ratio relative  to its debt- 
GDP  ratio  than  does Africa  or Asia, mainly  because of the lower export- 
GDP ratio in Latin America. The more closed economies in Latin 
America  have less relative  capacity  for debt service than  the more  open 
Asian ones do, and so run into crisis conditions sooner. The African 
LDCs have a low interest-export  ratio, compared  to their debt-export 
ratio. A high proportion  of African borrowing  is from international 
institutions  at subsidized  rates,  while Latin  American  and  Asian  borrow- 
1.  William Branson,  "Economic  Structure and Policy  for External Balance,"  in A. 
W.  Hooke,  ed.,  Exchange  Rate  Regimes  and  Policy  Interdependence  (International 
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ing is from banks. The analysis of the importance  of trade structure 
provides  a useful link  between the Dornbusch  and Sachs papers. 
A second point on the framework  model is that the three  channels  of 
influence  are not themselves exogenous events. In general,  any macro- 
economic disturbance  in the OECD will have effects on the LDCs 
through  all three  channels.  This is shown in the offset case presented  in 
Dornbusch's  table  2, which  takes off from  the Reagan  quotation.  There, 
trade  effects and  debt  effects are  largely  offsetting.  The  point  is important 
and substantive, but it also calls into question the usefulness of the 
categorization  of transmission  channels mentioned  earlier. To use the 
framework  model, we must first translate  any given exogenous world 
disturbance  into effects on the LDC involved via terms of trade, debt 
service, and export volume, and then aggregate  these into a net effect, 
as in table  2. 
In applying  the model Dornbusch rightly emphasizes that welfare 
effects generally come from exogenous changes in relative prices at 
initial  quantities.  These are the usual welfare effects of public finance 
theory. The endogenous adjustment  of volume in a fully employed 
economy  requires  that  resources  be moved  from  alternative  uses toward, 
for example, the traded  goods sector. This is all summarized  neatly in 
the welfare  measure  of equation  3. 
Exceptions, in which export volume effects should also be counted 
as welfare  gains, generally  come in cases where an initial  disequilibrium 
already  exists when the disturbance  occurs. In the case of preexisting 
wage rigidity and unemployment, for example, the official price of 
foreign  exchange  might  be less than  the shadow  price  because  resources 
are  free to move to the traded  goods sector. In such  a case export  volume 
effects couldjustifiably  be included  in the welfare  calculation  for a policy 
to counter  the recession due to an external shock. Of course, this may 
be policy that is only second-best to the preferred  one of removing  the 
distortion  in foreign  exchange  pricing  in the first  place. 
This is the line that Dornbusch, correctly, takes in the theoretical 
analysis  presented  in the first  part  of the paper.  It is a useful alternative 
to the  usual  practice  of including  hard-earned  expansion  of export  volume 
as positive  in  the welfare  calculation.  But  after  the  good start,  Dornbusch 
backslides. Export volume effects play a central  role in his analysis of 
the effects of an OECD  expansion  and are featured  in his discussion of 
policy alternatives.  Too bad! 
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The connection  between  LDC and  OECD  growth  is summarized  in table 
6. The regressions  show a significantly  positive but  unstable  elasticity  of 
response  of LDC  to OECD  growth.  The  result  is suspect  for  two reasons. 
First, the table and surrounding  text suggest that the LDC growth  data 
do not adjust  for changes  in debt service as interest  rates  react  to OECD 
growth.  The  data  of table  2 show  that  this  can  be an  important  adjustment. 
This raises the question  of whether  the table 6 results would stand  up if 
this adjustment  were made to both LDC and OECD growth. Second, 
the results could change if the regression  period were broken into the 
subperiods  1960-73  and 1973-84.  The  data  of table 10  provide  an implicit 
comparison  of OECD growth  in GDP and LDC export volume growth 
for the subperiods 1960-70 and 1970-83. OECD growth fell from the 
earlier  to the later period, while LDC export volume increased. Thus 
the positive relation  between GDP  growth  rates in table  6 might  weaken 
substantively  if the sample  period  were divided. 
The analysis of movements  in real commodity  prices leaves several 
loose ends, although the model of equations 5-8 is exemplary in its 
clarity  on the need to define  real  commodity  prices  in terms  of a currency 
basket. Figure  5 and table 8 present commodity  price indexes deflated 
by the industrial  countries'  average  export  unit  value. But in table  9, the 
regressions for determinants  of real commodity prices use indexes 
deflated  by the U.S. GNP deflator.  These overemphasize  the role of the 
dollar  in a period  of dollar  appreciation  vis-a-vis the EMS and the yen. 
The point that dollar  appreciation  should lower real commodity  prices 
in terms  of the dollar,  but  raise them  in terms  of the EMS, is made  in the 
text but is obscured in table 9. This problem reappears  in the policy 
discussion  that  follows, where the focus is on the real  price  of commod- 
ities in terms  of the dollar. 
A final point on quantification  is raised by the interpretation  of the 
table 11  regressions  for export  volume  growth.  These include  a compet- 
itiveness  variable  measured  by changes  in  relative  prices.  The  coefficient 
of this variable  is significantly  negative,  leading  Dornbusch  to comment 
that "the significant  response of export volume to competitiveness of 
course points to adjustment  programs  that involve real depreciation  as 
an important  element." In fact, the table 11  results  suggest  that  this may 
be true for LDC manufacturing  exporters, but not for the rest of the 
LDCs. The first two equations of the table are for all LDCs, and the 
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are  for manufacturing  exporters,  and  the coefficient  is about -  1.25.  The 
first coefficient weights manufacturers  and nonmanufacturers  into an 
overall  average.  If manufacturing  exporters  have a weight  of 0.4 or more 
in total  exports  of LDCs, the coefficients  in table 11  would  be consistent 
with a zero or negative elasticity of the nonmanufacturers'  exports to 
changes in competitiveness.2  Thus Dornbusch's results in table 11 
implicitly  support  the hypothesis  that  nonmanufacturing  exporters  such 
as the African  LDCs have much  lower elasticity than  the manufactures 
exporters.  I argued  this position  in the 1983  article  cited by Dornbusch. 
Dornbusch's  discussion  of OECD  policy mixes  draws  on the previous 
results  to note the ambiguity  of the effect of OECD  growth  on the LDC 
borrowers  unless the source of this growth  is specified.  The need for a 
shift in the mix of monetary  and fiscal policy in the OECD, with fiscal 
tightening  in the United States and ease in the rest of the OECD, has 
been, and still is, advocated  by Dornbusch  as forwarding  the interest  of 
both the industrial  countries  and  the LDCs. I agree. 
William R. Cline: Rudiger  Dornbusch's  paper deftly summarizes  the 
analytical  framework  for the influence  of OECD macroeconomic  per- 
formance  on the problem  of LDC debt, and I broadly agree with his 
approach.  My comments will focus on points of disagreement  and on 
some specifics. 
The empirical  estimation  of net windfall  changes  from  terms  of trade, 
LIBOR,  and  inflation  in 1984  in table  2 is seriously  misleading.  Because 
Dornbusch  obtains  a long-term  discount  factor  from  an extremely  short- 
term price trend-three  months-his  measure is  subject to volatile 
swings. Compounding  the problem, the price concept is LDC export 
unit  value, which is much  more unstable  than the overall  price concept 
for  opportunity  costs of both  exports  and  imports.  Specifically,  for  April- 
October 1984,  Dornbusch's  three-month  forward  period, export prices 
fell 2.2 percent relative to January-July  1984. Dornbusch  annualized 
this trend  to an 8.8 percent  decline, compared  with a decline of only 0.6 
2. Let e represent  elasticity  of export volume with respect to competitiveness,  with 
subscripts  t for total,  m for  manufacturers  and  n for nonmanufacturers.  Let cx  be the share 
of nonmanufacturers  in total  exports.  Then  the estimated  elasticity  coefficients  are  related 
by: 
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percent  in 1983  on a comparable  basis, giving  a reduction  in inflation  that 
far  exceeds the 12  percent  reduction  in LIBOR  and  causes a windfall  $39 
billion loss from the discount factor. If, instead, a slightly  longer time 
period  is used for the price trend-year-on-year increases  for 1984  and 
1983-and the average  of industrial  country  and  LDC export  unit  values 
is used as the price  concept, application  of Dornbusch's  equation  for the 
real discount factor, R*, gives 0.892 in 1984  and 0.841 in 1983, for an 
improvement  of 0.051 instead  of a deterioration  of 0.076.' The principal 
difference  is that  measured  inflation  increases  from - 6.6 percent  in 1983 
to -  1.9 percent  in 1984,  in contrast  to a decrease  from  0 percent  in 1983 
to  - 8.8 percent in 1984 in the Dornbusch three-month  windows as 
annualized.  On this basis, the windfall  effect from a change in the real 
discount  factor  is a gain  of $31.2  billion  instead  of a loss of $38.8 billion, 
and the total net windfall  effect in Dornbusch's  table 2 becomes a gain 
of $70.4  billion  instead  of only $0.4  billion.  President  Reagan  is right  (and 
conservative) even on windfall  effects, on this basis. But the broader 
point  is that  the calculation  of long-term  present  values  of real  debt  based 
on very short-term  variations  in  price,  especially  LDC  export  unit  values, 
can give rise to nonsense results  because of wide fluctuations. 
Dornbusch  is, of course, correct to remind  us that nominal  export 
values should not be compared with these windfall effects, because 
resources  are required  to increase  export  value. But his own framework 
subsequently  allows for welfare  gains  from  trade  volume  increase  in the 
presence of idle domestic capacity (which existed) and a high shadow 
price of foreign  exchange  (also present).  The volume increase  in nonoil 
LDC exports in 1984  amounted  to $24.8 billion  at 1983  prices. Applying 
a shadow  price premium  of 30 percent, the expansion  of export volume 
generated  a welfare gain of $7.4 billion. Once again President  Reagan 
was right;  he merely  omitted  the following  sentence  fragment  in his draft 
speech: "After  taking  account  of the shadow  price premium  on foreign 
exchange..  . ." 
The model of welfare effects proposed by Dornbusch is useful. It 
would be helpful  to develop its implications  for the current  debate on 
resource  transfers.  That debate typically ignores the fact that outward 
resource  transfer  does provide  a positive welfare  effect in the reduction 
of  the terminal debt on the country's balance sheet; Dornbusch's 
1.  International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics,  vol.38  (September 
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equation  explicitly  includes  terminal  debt  with  a negative  sign. Similarly, 
exploration of the different conditions under which export volume 
expansion has positive welfare effects-low  resource utilization, high 
foreign  exchange  shadow  price-or  negative  welfare  effects, as assumed 
in the standard  critique of outward transfer of resources, would be 
helpful. 
The analysis  of real commodity  price  finds  a statistical  fact without  a 
theory:  the real  price  is inversely  related  to the strength  of the dollar.  At 
the outset the discussion accurately states the intuitive relationship: 
dollar  strength  should affect only the nominal  commodity  price, not its 
real price relative to manufactures.  In particular,  the nominal dollar 
price of all traded goods, manufactures  or commodities, should be 
expected to move negatively with the strength of the dollar, by the 
proportion:  unity minus  U.S. share  in world  trade.  Otherwise,  a change 
in  the exchange  rate  between  the dollar  and  other  currencies  would  cause 
a change  in the real  resources  commanded  globally  by a pound  of coffee, 
for example.2 
If the Dornbusch  finding  is robust,  it is important  for  the debt  problem, 
because it means  that  as the dollar  declines  from  its overvalued  levels of 
1982-84,  there will be twofold relief. Nominal  dollar  debt will be easier 
to carry as nominal  dollar export values rise from dollar depreciation 
expected in theory, and  as the dollar  value of a given real  trade  surplus, 
which most major  debtors  currently  have achieved, increases. In addi- 
tion, the export  base will rise still  further  for commodity  exporters  from 
a gain in real  price (the unexplained  empirical  observation).  A caveat is 
in order,  however, considering  the continued  erosion of dollar  prices of 
commodities through the third quarter of  1985 despite the dollar's 
significant  decline  from  its February  high. 
Ronald  McKinnon  has suggested  one reason  for  a negative  correlation 
2. I prefer  the  following  formulation:  percentage  change  in dollar  price  of traded  goods 
equals  average  international  domestic  inflation  plus 0.8 times percentage  depreciation  of 
the effective exchange  rate of the dollar,  with 0.2 as an approximate  parameter  for the 
share  of the United  States  in world  trade.  This equation  tracks  the data  relatively  well; in 
1976-78,  cumulative  consumer  price  inflation  in  industrial  countries  averaged  16.2  percent, 
the dollar  declined  by 9 percent,  and  world  trade  prices  in dollars  (unit  value  of industrial 
country  exports) rose by 22 percent. In 1980-84, cumulative  consumer  price inflation 
averaged  30 percent,  but traded  goods prices  in dollars  actually  declined  by 12.6  percent 
because  of a rise in the dollar  of 43.7 percent.  International  Financial  Statistics, various 
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of real commodity prices with dollar strength (by communication). 
Because of the important  role of the dollar in the international  money 
supply, a weak dollar  tends to coincide with global  inflation-expansion, 
while a strong dollar is usually associated with more deflationary- 
contractionary  global macroeconomic  conditions. Thus, the influence 
of global  business  activity may be picked  up by dollar  strength,  contrib- 
uting  to real  commodity  price  change. Although  Dornbusch's  equations 
already  include  activity  directly,  there  may  be an  additional  expectational 
dimension  for activity  reflected  by dollar  strength. 
If the real  commodity  price link  to the dollar  is reliable,  Dornbusch's 
distinction  between commodity  importers  such as Korea  and exporters 
such as Brazil  is useful in differentiating  macroeconomic  impact  on the 
debt problem.  Perhaps  an even more important  distinction  Dornbusch 
omits  is that  between  oil exporters  and  oil importers.  Because  past  prices 
have been administered  and  underlying  trends  are toward  weakness, oil 
is the one major  commodity  in which dollar  prices are unlikely  to rise in 
the medium  term  in response  to a decline in the dollar's  strength.  For oil 
exporting countries, dollar depreciation  tends to aggravate  the debt 
burden,  by raising  the dollar  price of imports  without  compensation  in 
oil prices. A final  note on the commodity  estimates is that they show a 
surprisingly  low influence  of interest rates; one would have expected 
that high interest  rates had played a substantial  role in the weakness of 
prices for some commodities,  such as copper, through  the reduction  in 
demand  for inventories. 
The new empirical estimates of the export volume and revenue 
elasticities of LDC exports with respect to OECD growth  are a useful 
addition  to the literature.  They tend to confirm  relatively  high respon- 
siveness, and thus to reinforce  the prevailing  view of the importance  of 
sustained OECD growth for resolution  of the debt problem. Whether 
the cyclical export volume elasticity is 2 or 3-and  whether it sharply 
exceeds the secular  elasticity  of about  2-is  probably  less important  for 
the future than it was in the period 1982-84, when the OECD growth 
rate rose by a highly unusual 5 percentage points. Dornbusch might 
highlight  more than he does the other result in these equations: the 
country's real exchange rate makes a significant  difference to export 
earnings,  especially  for exporters  of manufactures.  This result  provides 
additional  evidence for trade elasticity optimism and encouragement 
that debtor countries can affect their situation by their own policy 
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On  the implications  for macroeconomic  policy in industrial  countries, 
I would agree  completely  that the ideal scenario  is one in which interest 
rate declines prompt  not only OECD  growth  but also a declining  dollar. 
At one point, however, Dornbusch  seems to see a current  paralysis  in 
the options, because he fears the inflationary  impact of depreciation. 
Surely  that  impact  will  be greater  and  the real  distortions  of the  allocation 
of resources  between  tradables  and  nontradables  more  severe the longer 
the  correction  of the dollar  is postponed-and continuation  of the current 
situation may not be a real option. The scenario finally preferred  by 
Dornbusch-correction of the fiscal deficit "over the next few years," 
transitory  European  fiscal  expansion,  and  a soft landing  for the dollar- 
is plausible, but a more immediate fiscal correction, combined with 
compensating  monetary  expansion, would be preferable;  and a smooth 
but more rapid  correction  of the dollar  within, say, two to three years 
would surely  be preferable  to an extremely  slow correction. 
Dornbusch's  equation  10  is the right  one for analyzing  the conditions 
for improvement  in the debt problem.3  Table 13  is misleading  about  the 
performance  using the criterion  of interest rate compared  with export 
growth, however. If the latter period were divided into 1980-82 and 
1983-84,  the results  would  appear  far  more  favorable,  as nominal  interest 
rates declined while export growth recovered in the latter period.4 
Dornbusch  is right  to conclude that nominal  export  growth  in the range 
of 10 to 15 percent may be expected. Over the next four years I would 
specify this growth  as follows: 6 percent  volume (elasticity  of 2 applied 
to OECD growth  of 3 percent), plus 5 percent for world inflation,  plus 
perhaps 5 percent annually for dollar depreciation (0.8 times dollar 
depreciation),  for annual  nominal  growth  of 15-16  percent. 
Dornbusch's  conclusion that OECD developments will do little to 
help debtors, and that LDCs must resolve the debt problem  on their 
own, may be somewhat  misleading  if interpreted  to mean  that they will 
3. For  a similar  development  of this equation  and  its application  to the examination  of 
combinations  of OECD growth  and LIBOR at which recovery from the debt problem 
continues, see William  R. Cline, "International  Debt: Analysis, Experience,  and Pros- 
pects,"  Journal of Development  Planning,  no.  16 (1985), pp. 25-55. 
4.  For 1985  the data  in table 13  are misleading.  In October  the IMF  forecast  that 1985 
export  value  in dollars  would  decline  by 0.2 percent  for nonoil  LDCs, instead  of 9 percent 
as indicated  in the table. See International  Monetary  Fund, World  Economic Oltlook 
(October 1985),  p. 66. Exports in 1985  were expected to rise by 4 percent in volume, 
however, suggesting  that once the effects of the reversal  of sharp  dollar  appreciation  in 
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have to accept still lower growth  in the future  and carry  out much  more 
severe real  devaluations  than  they have already  experienced  since 1982. 
On the contrary,  the debt equation  would suggest that they can make 
rapid progress toward creditworthiness  merely by maintaining  their 
current relatively high trade surpluses. With LIBOR plus spread at 
perhaps  11  percent, export  growth  at 15  percent, the trade  surplus  at 27 
percent of exports, and the debt-export  ratio at 3, equation 10 gives a 
decline of the debt-export  ratio to 2, a threshold  often associated with 
creditworthiness,  within three years, a decline at 13 percent annually. 
And  experience  in Brazil  in 1985  suggests  that  continued  trade  surpluses 
are  feasible  even in  the face of domestic  recovery  in  the debtor  country- 
if real  appreciation  of the exchange  rate  is avoided. 
Dornbusch's  analysis  of inflation  is suggestive  but basically  mislead- 
ing to the extent that it might  imply that the problem  of domestic infla- 
tion may be attributed  to the external  debt crisis. Venezuela's inflation 
is in the range  of 10  percent  while Argentina's  passed 1000  percent, but 
both countries had to face comparable  shocks in import cutbacks in 
dealing with the debt problem. The fiscal squeeze from borrowing  at 
home what can no longer  be borrowed  abroad  depends  on the extent to 
which real interest  rates on borrowing  from the public  at home exceed 
international  rates.  Despite  the spectacular  real  rates  cited  by Dornbusch 
(which are too high even for corporate  borrowers  who sometimes pay 
30 percent;  savers are lucky to receive 10  percent  or even positive real 
rates at all), the domestic rates to the government  are not generally  far 
above international  rates. As for real wages in the adjustment  process, 
they need not decline if the share of nontradables  in the consumption 
basket is sufficient,  because real wages must rise in terms of nontrad- 
ables; otherwise the profit signal to switch resources to tradables  is 
missing. 
Dornbusch  is of course right  to stress the need to avoid protection, 
although  the current  risk  seems to be more  that  the debtor  countries  will 
be sideswiped by a general protectionist response to the overvalued 
dollar, with the main focus  on Japan, rather than singled out for 
protection,  partly  because of adverse  effects on Brazil  and  other  debtor 
countries. Dornbusch  is also correct to highlight  the emerging  prob- 
lem that banks may be too ambitious  in their timetable  for disengage- 
ment from Latin America, causing excessive contraction  of external 
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General Discussion 
Several discussants of Rudiger  Dornbusch's paper commented on 
table  2, which  contrasts  cash-flow  calculations  with  welfare  calculations 
concerning  the effects of changes  in the international  economic  environ- 
ment  over the 1983-84  period  on the LDCs. In Dornbusch's  analysis  of 
export revenues, only changes due to changes in the terms of trade 
holding export volume constant improve welfare, since effort and 
resources are required  to produce additional  exports. But Lawrence 
Krause  noted that the Asian economies value increased  export volume 
because it helps them to realize economies of scale that they cannot 
realize within their domestic economies. Paul Krugman  was uneasy 
about Dornbusch's method of calculating  the real interest rate in his 
welfare  analysis. Krugman  pointed  to figure  8, which shows the Dorn- 
busch-style real interest rate for nonoil LDCs swinging  between + 47 
percent  and - 34  percent  over  the 1973-84  period,  and  implies  an  increase 
in the real rate of interest between 1983 and 1984 on the order of 35 
percentage  points. He questioned  the relevance  of a measure  that could 
exhibit  so much  short-term  volatility.  If, for example, there  were a large 
one-time  increase in LDC export prices, the Dornbusch  welfare calcu- 
lation  would show a large  decrease  in the real  interest  rate,  followed the 
next year  by a return  to the original  real  interest  rate.  The LDCs' implied 
debt servicing  costs would be lower in the year prices increased  than  in 
any subsequent  year, so that looking at the figures  for the first year in 
isolation  would  be very misleading.  Both Krugman  and  John  Williamson 
suggested  modifying  Dornbusch's  real interest  rate calculations  to take 
into account  both current  changes  in relative  exchange  rates  and  expec- 
tations concerning  future changes, though neither  was able to suggest 
specifically  how this might  be done. 
Williamson  argued  that in 1980  there was no reason to consider the 
volume  of LDC  borrowing  excessive, but  he suggested  that  there  should 
have been concern over so much of the borrowing  taking  the form of 
floating rate loans, which impose all of the interest rate risk on the 
borrower.  In Williamson's  view, arrangements  under  which  lenders  and 
borrowers  shared  that risk would have been preferable  and should be 
sought in the future. Richard Cooper questioned whether such an 
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countries  were a major  source of funds  for lending  in 1979  and 1980  and 
that they had been quite unwilling  to lend on other than a short-term 
basis. Williamson  replied  that  the fact that  the OPEC  countries  were the 
immediate  source  of funds  for  many  of the LDC  loans  was not  particularly 
relevant. The total world capital market  is many times the size of all 
OPEC  funds  combined,  he reasoned,  so that  it should  have  been  possible 
to draw  upon  other sources of world  savings  for the LDC loans. 
Several  comments  were directed  towards  the quantitative  analysis  of 
linkages between the OECD economies and the LDC economies pre- 
sented  in the third  section of the paper.  One  puzzle in those results  is the 
larger-than-expected  effect of dollar  appreciation  on commodity  prices 
in the table 9 models. Robert  Lawrence  suggested  that this large  effect 
might  reflect  problems  with the Economist  commodity  price index. He 
pointed  to table  8, where  data  on both the Economist  and  the IMF  index 
of commodity  prices are presented;  the two move quite  differently,  and 
the Economist index appears  to be more volatile than the IMF index. 
The weighting  underlying  the Economist  index is a bit odd, since it gives 
a large weight to just a few commodities, such as copper. Williamson 
noted the implication  of table 11 that the volume of nonmanufactured 
exports responds very little to shifts in exchange rates and cautioned 
against  interpreting  this as evidence that countries  relying  on nonman- 
ufactured  exports need not worry about maintaining  competitive ex- 
change  rates. Instead, he interpreted  the low elasticity  as evidence that 
creating new trade movements can take quite a long time. Finally, 
Lawrence advocated looking at reduced-form  models of the effect of 
exogenous  factors  on the terms  of trade,  rather  than  only estimating  the 
intermediate  linkages  in sequence. 